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ABSTRACT
Media policy debates are today marred by outdated and
ultimately unworkable justifications for government intervention in
media markets. Both proponents and opponents of such intervention
have obscured the appropriate goals of media policy. Moreover, they
have paid insufficient attention to the impact of digital media on the
marketplace of ideas. This article proposes a new account of media
policy goals and offers the first detailed analysis of how new media
market dynamics should affect future media policies.
Policies that promote greater diversity in video products,
whether through regulations or subsidies, serve both reactive and
proactive purposes. In its reactive posture, media policy aims to
correct what I call narrow market failures. These are failures of
media markets to deliver content that small audience segments desire.
But media policy must also pursue a proactive agenda by
supplementing even well-functioning markets. This proactive thrust
responds to broad failures of the market to deliver media content that
audiences might not currently desire, but promotes democratic
discourse and social solidarity.
What this article shows is that digital networks substantially
affect both reactive and proactive media policy objectives. Existing
media policies are premised on the mid-twentieth century reality of
scarce content and abundant audience attention. But in the digital
era, it is attention that is scarce and content that is abundant.
Drawing on empirical evidence and theory from several disciplines, I
show how this shift changes the narrow market failures to which
media policy must respond and undermines past responses to broad
market failures. This article concludes with an application of these
theories to media subsidies, arguing that subsidies for a robust public
service media are the proper channel for media policy in the digital
era from both a First Amendment and practical perspective.
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I. Introduction
Federal media policy is in a state of flux. In 2003, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) relaxed its limits on media
concentration in a controversial ruling that both Congress and the
courts later criticized.1 Now, the FCC will re-evaluate these rules
*
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Covington & Burling. J.D., Harvard University, 1992, A.B., Harvard University,
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1
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, 13634 (2003),
remanded in part sub nom. Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372
(3rd Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Media Ownership Order]. Both during and after the
FCC deliberations, there emerged surprisingly fierce and widespread opposition to
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amidst heated debates about broadcast “indecency,”2 public television
funding,3 and public interest obligations for digital television.4 As
these policy disputes unfold, the media landscape is changing
dramatically, most notably because of digital networks. And yet,
analysis of how emerging patterns of media use affect policy has been
relatively scant.5 Moreover, neither policymakers nor commentators
have effectively articulated media policy goals beyond a narrow
allegiance to consumer sovereignty.
This Article offers a new analytic framework for evaluating
media policies in the digital era. It starts from the following premise:
the purpose of government intervention in video markets has as much
to do with influencing the consumption of media products as with
responding to existing consumer demands that the market has failed
to satisfy. In this sense, media policy must be, and to some extent has
long been, proactive as well as reactive. An emphasis on the reactive
media ownership deregulation. See Robert W. McChesney and John Nichols, Up in
Flames, NATION, Nov. 17, 2003, at 11; Gal Beckerman, Tripping Up Big Media,
COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 15. Opponents of media
consolidation, including such disparate groups as the ACLU, the National Rifle
Association, the AFL-CIO, the Parents Television Council, and the National
Organization for Women, achieved what was thought to be impossible: a
Republican Congress’ roll-back of a Republican FCC’s rule changes within one
month. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118
Stat. 3, 99 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West Supp. 2004)).
2
In the aftermath of the notorious breast-baring performance of singer Janet
Jackson at the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show, Congress loudly moved to
introduce legislation increasing penalties for indecent broadcasts. Broadcast
Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, H.R. 3717, 108th Cong.; Broadcast Decency
Enforcement Act of 2004, S.2056, 108th Cong. The FCC recently requested
comment, in response to a Congressional directive, on whether some violent
programming should be considered “indecent.” Violent Television Programming
and its Impact on Children, Notice of Inquiry, MB Docket No. 04-261 (July 28,
2004).
3
The funding of public television will be at issue in the reauthorization of the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, see The Public Broadcasting Reauthorization
Act of 2004, S. 2645, 108th Cong., and in initiatives to funnel federal support for
public television into a permanently-funded trust fund. See Testimony of John M.
Lawson, President and CEO, The Association of Public Television Stations before
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp. (June 9, 2004), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1220&wit_id=3514.
4
See Public Interest Obligations of Television Broadcast Licensees, Notice of
Inquiry, 14 F.C.C.R. 21633 (1999); Children’s Television Obligations of Digital
Television Broadcasters, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 22946
(2000).
5
This article deals with the subset of media policy comprised of federal intervention
in the market for video distributed to the public by cable, broadcast, satellite, and
Internet broadband networks.
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media policy goal – the perfection of consumer sovereignty – has
dominated the discourse since media deregulation gathered speed in
the 1980’s. Indeed the most powerful critique of media regulatory
policy today is that media markets are competitive enough to ensure
that consumers are well served.6 To date, commentators have failed
to answer such critiques effectively in light of technological change,7
and policymakers have largely proceeded on the assumption that these
critiques are correct.
By articulating the proactive justification for media policy,
this article offers a new prescription for public policy in this area. On
the conceptual level, media policy should support the kind of
marketplace of ideas that democracies need, doing more than just
promoting the satisfaction of existing tastes. It must strive to cultivate
those tastes in ways that build social solidarity and democratic debate.
There was little need to distinguish the proactive from the reactive in
media policy theory so long as conditions of mid-twentieth century
media markets obtained. These were conditions in which video
content was scarce and audience attention was abundant. A public
hungry for content and captive to the schedules of three major
broadcast networks was likely to be exposed in significant numbers to
all content on offer, even programming that it did not initially
demand.
In the changing technological environment, with digital
networks remaking the mediascape, the scarce resource is attention,
not programming. Content abundance is replacing scarcity and
attention scarcity is replacing audience captivity to network
schedules. Today, consumers sit in the eye of a storm of bits surging
through cable and satellite channels, DVDs, video games and
websites.8 Moreover, program guides and search engines allow them
6
See, e.g., Bruce M. Owen, Regulatory Reform: The Telecommunications Act of
1996 and the FCC Media Ownership Rules, 2003 DET. C. L. REV. 671; Christopher
S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L. J. 1579
(2003).
7
See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY (2002); CASS
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
8
Digital plenty has a holographic character, allowing critics to see media products
as either tremendously diverse or monotonously similar. The perception of
diversity focuses on the sheer number of outlets. For example, most Americans
have access to more than 100 television channels, dozens of radio stations, and
thousands of Internet radio stations and news venues. Media Ownership Order,
supra note xx at 13620, 13634 (2003); Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Tenth Annual
Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, 1608 (2004) [hereinafter Video Competition Report];
Testimony of Michael Powell, FCC Chairman, before the Comm. on Commerce,
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to construct their own media environment into which the unsought
media experience seldom strays. The supply of programming for
which there is no ready demand, but anticipated public value, is
unlikely to reach viewers who are otherwise committed.
The growing abundance of media content, contrary to the
claims of deregulators, is not a basis for the dismantling of media
policy. Rather, new media dynamics require new policy approaches.
First, policymakers must resist the facile conclusion that media
abundance guarantees consumer satisfaction. Rather, notwithstanding
the explosion of media distribution channels, there will remain
demand that media producers fail to satisfy because of the economic
and cultural characteristics of media. Second, technological change
requires an emphasis on media subsidies as opposed to regulations, as
an instrument of proactive media policy. Subsidies can achieve what
regulations cannot:
they can influence consumer appetites
constitutionally, without relying on the shaky First Amendment
exceptionalism that underlies much broadcast regulation.9
In conceptualizing a new vision for media policy, this Article
progresses as follows. Part II distills what I have identified as
reactive and proactive media policy goals, showing how they grow
out of various democratic theories, how they have been implemented
to varying degrees in policy, and how they relate to varieties of
market failure.

Science,
and
Transp.,
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235127A1.pdf (June 4,
2003) (“people today have access to more information from more diverse sources
than at any time in our history…”). The perception of sameness focuses on patterns
of ownership of, and programming on, these many channels. See, e.g., BEN
BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 3-26 (4th ed. 1996) (showing how the largest
media companies dominate the print, broadcast, cable, satellite, film and online
content industries); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, CORPORATE MEDIA AND THE THREAT
TO DEMOCRACY 17-22 (1997) (arguing that big media produce voluminous amounts
of homogeneous content).
9
Regulations of broadcasting that would be unconstitutional if applied to print or
new electronic media like cable and the Internet, have passed muster on the grounds
that the airwaves are unusually scarce and the government’s interest in controlling
them unusually great. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Multiplying channels of communication
undermine this First Amendment exceptionalism. See infra notes xx and
accompanying text. I have argued elsewhere that tightening First Amendment
constraints on media policy necessitate the more creative use of subsidies, as
opposed to regulations, to effectuate policy goals. See Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains
in the Information Marketplace: The Use of Government Subsidies to Regulate New
Media, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. LAW 217, 224-28, 231-38 (2002).
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Part III shows how digital media affect the pursuit of these
media policy agendas. By analyzing the relationship between distinct
policy goals and consumer choice in both the ebbing analog
mediascape and the emerging digital one, I demonstrate how digital
media may improve the functioning of media markets, but will not
correct all failures of the market to satisfy consumer demand. More
importantly, digital media will reduce the likelihood of consumer
exposure to unsought, but ultimately valuable, media experiences.
Given the consumer impact of new media dynamics, Part IV
argues that simply putting content into the mass media flow is
unlikely to attract viewers to content they did not seek, but media
policy urges upon them. At the same time, First Amendment
constraints limit the creative possibilities of media regulation. Pursuit
of proactive media policy goals requires a new emphasis on media
subsidies, and a new brand of public service media that engages a
distracted and fractured audience in content that is important for
democratic flourishing. Media subsidies must literally emerge from
the broadcast box to be effective in the digital mediascape, taking
advantage of new communicative tools, techniques, and real space
encounters to bring the public to programming. Recent “out of the
box” public broadcasting initiatives, although limited by existing legal
authority and funding, illustrate the possibilities for using multiple
distribution platforms and techniques of public engagement to
develop demand for and exposure to under-produced content.
II. Media Policy, Civic Life, and Consumer Sovereignty
Media policy assumes a special bond between media outputs
and the character and vibrancy of democracy – a connection that does
not exist for other consumer products.10 The existence of this bond
charges media policy discussions and fuses them to a larger discourse
about democratic culture. At the same time, video products are
consumer goods, chosen or rejected through marketplace mechanics.
Obscured in both media policy and the underlying theory is the
appropriate relationship between policy goals and the market.
The most vigorously defended, and widely embraced, posture
of media policy is reactive. In this stance, policy submits to the yoke
of consumer sovereignty and strives to make media markets more
10

See Cheryl Leanza and Harold Feld, More than “A Toaster with Pictures”:
Defending Media Ownership Limits, 21 COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER 12 (2003).
Despite its ambitions, American media policy is today a rather modest enterprise.
Indeed, there is very little to it outside of structural regulations, consumer protection
rules, subsidies in the broadcast area, and some limited access requirements for
cable and satellite.
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responsive to consumer demand. Another posture, sometimes evident
in policy, but required by theory, is proactive or aspirational. The
proactive approach to media policy accepts, as Cass Sunstein has put
it, that there “is a large difference between the public interest and
what interests the public.”11 Between the reactive and aspirational
approaches is the tension between satisfying and shaping media
experiences – a tension that digital media exacerbate. This section
briefly outlines today’s major media policy goals: diversity and
localism in commercial media, and diversity, localism and the elusive
property of excellence in noncommercial media.12 It goes on to show
how the policies themselves and their theoretical justifications depend
on, but sell short, aspirations to shape media experiences through
policy.
A. Media Policy Components
The Supreme Court has identified speech diversity as a “basic
tenet of national communications policy” because “the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”13 Diversity policy is
11

Cass Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 501
(2000). But cf. Mark Fowler & Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 202, 210-11 (1982) (“the public’s interest
… defines the public interest.”).
12
Philip Napoli has made particularly careful study of diversity and localism. See
Philip M. Napoli, Deconstructing the Diversity Principle, 49 J. COMM. 7 (1999);
Philip M. Napoli, The Localism Principle Under Stress, 2 INFO: J. POL’Y, REG. &
STRATEGY FOR TELECOMM. INFO. & MEDIA 573 (2000), Philip M. Napoli, The
Localism Principle in Communications Policymaking and Policy Analysis:
Ambiguity, Inconsistency, and Empirical Neglect, 29 POL. STUD. J. 372 (2001),
Philip M. Napoli, Access and Fundamental Principles in Communication Policy,
2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 797. Another important goal of media policy
is to increase competition in media markets. See, e.g., Media Ownership Order,
supra note xx at 13642 (stating that increased competition in media markets
produces “more innovation and improved service”). To the extent that competition
is desired for non-economic reasons, it duplicates the diversity goal. To the extent
that competition serves economic purposes, it is it is an objective of most regulatory
intervention in markets and does not distinguish media policy.
13
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668
n.27 (1972) (plurality opinion) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1, 20 (1945)). Endorsements of speech diversity as a primary media policy goal
abound. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990)
(upholding minority ownership policies on grounds that they furthered media
diversity); FCC v. Nat’l. Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978)
(upholding broadcast ownership regulations aimed at diversifying mass media); Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing
diversity as a legitimate goal of media policy); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512

2004]

Media Policy Out of the Box

7

embedded in twentieth century First Amendment jurisprudence.14 It
reflects the instrumentalist free speech tradition that values unfettered
expression for society’s sake, not for the speaker’s sake.15
Expression, in antagonistic engagement, is expected to produce a
healthy democratic culture of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
debate.”16 This debate, in turn is important for uncovering truths
important for both public and private life.17 Taking its instructions
U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (upholding policies promoting “access to a multiplicity of
information sources”).
14
See, e.g., Turner Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 663 (characterizing
speech diversity policy as “a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it
promotes values central to the First Amendment.”). See also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens
Comm. For Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (associating the FCC’s public interest
mandate with First Amendment goals).
15
See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is
paramount.”). See also Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa
L. Rev. 1405, 1409-11 (1986) (defending the instrumentalist view of the First
Amendment); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 275-77
(1992). The Supreme Court has drawn on this instrumentalist view a number of
times to uphold media structural regulations. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding rules governing network and affiliate station
relationships); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. For Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978)
(upholding cross-ownership restrictions between local newspapers and broadcast
stations). See generally, C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based
Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57. In recent years, lower
courts have taken a more essentialist, liberty oriented view of the First Amendment
in communications cases, resulting in the reversal of media regulations held to
infringe on media companies’ speech rights. See, e.g., Time Warner Entertainment
Co., v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta that cable
ownership restrictions interfere with operators’ “speech rights by restricting the
number of viewers to whom they can speak.”); Comcast Cablevision v. Broward
County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that local regulation
requiring cable operators to carry competing broadband providers violated
operators’ speech rights). See generally C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration:
Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 847-855 (2002) (criticizing recent
lower court decisions on structural media regulations).
16
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
17
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), in ON LIBERTY AND
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 13-48 (R. McCallum ed.,
1948) (extolling a diverse and contentious press as a defense against excessive state
power); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), in 2 Complete Prose Works of John
Milton 486 passim (E. Sirluck ed., 1959) (same); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (the purpose of the First Amendment is to preserve “an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”).
Contemporary theorists have extended the desired field of informational combat to
include cultural as well as narrowly political expression. See, e.g., BAKER [MEDIA,
MARKETS], supra note xx at 143-153 (advocating a complex democracy centered on
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from this instrumentalist free speech tradition, the FCC, operating
almost entirely within the broadcast arena, has tried to foster debate
by increasing the number of viewpoints, program genres, program
sources, and owners of distribution outlets within a market.18 After
experimenting with approaches aimed at each kind of diversity, the
agency has settled on increasing the number of independently owned
broadcast distribution outlets as the principal tool of diversity
policy.19
Ostensibly distinct from, but closely related to diversity
policy, is broadcast localism policy. This policy seeks to improve
broadcaster responsiveness to the needs and interests of the local
community, especially by strengthening the local voice in media.20
With localism as with diversity, ownership rules now bear the weight
of policy goals once encoded in more varied regulations.21 By
cultural diversity). Courts have taken the same expansive approach. See, e.g.,
Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1473 (C.D. Cal. 1992),
aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (“Artistic expression,
no less than academic speech or journalism … is at the core of a democratic
society’s cultural and political vitality.”).
18
Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13627 (identifying viewpoint, outlet,
program, source, and minority and female ownership diversity metrics). For a
comprehensive discussion of FCC rules emanating from its diversity policy, see 3
HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN, ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 14.4 (1999).
19
See, e.g., Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13633-13634. Policymakers
have long linked the ownership of media outlets with the viewpoint expressed in
programming. Id. at 13629-30 (discussing evidence of, and continued adherence to
policy based on, this linkage). See also Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM
and Television Broadcast Stations, 45 FCC 1476, 1477 (1964) (“[T]he greater the
diversity of ownership in a particular area, the less chance there is that a single
person or group can have an inordinate effect, in a political, editorial, or similar
programming sense, on public opinion at the regional level.”). The Supreme Court
has sanctioned this linkage. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547, 571 n. 16
(1990) (“ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit, and to choose the
methods, manner and emphasis of presentation…”).
20
For early endorsements of localism policy, see, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 139 (1940) (denying broadcasting application
because “applicant did not sufficiently represent local interests in the community.”);
FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 362 (1955) (upholding FCC’s
authority to distribute broadcast licenses “to a community in order to secure local
competition for originating and broadcasting programs of local interest”).
Congress reaffirmed localism as a media policy goal in the legislative history of the
1996 Telecommunications Act, H. Rep. No. 104-104 (1996) at 221 (localism “is a
vitally important value, … [and] should be preserved and enhanced as we reform
our laws for the next century.”).
21
Localism is, in principle, preserved through limitations on network ownership of
local stations and restrictions on network contractual requirements of their affiliated
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restricting ownership of local broadcast stations, the FCC hopes to
bolster local control over media content as measured by an ill-defined
brew of locally-produced content, content on matters of local interest,
and local say over content.22 Despite the ambiguity of the concept,
the recent political and popular protest against the FCC’s relaxation of
its broadcast ownership rules is a reminder that localism has broad
appeal.23 The courts continue to affirm localism as a media policy
goal and the FCC and Congress continue to assert it in regulating
existing and new media distribution services.24
stations. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2003). See generally National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 218 (1943) (upholding these rules, then referred to as
the chain broadcasting rules, as within the FCC’s authority). Other localism-based
requirements are that broadcast stations maintain a local studio, 47 C.F.R. §73.1125
(2003), maintain a public inspection file including a list of programs concerning
community issues, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(e)(11)(i) (2003), and give local
communities a chance to petition to deny a station’s application for renewal or
transfer of license, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3580 (2003).
22
Four times in the past several years, the courts have vacated or remanded
challenged broadcast and cable ownership regulations on the grounds that they were
not sufficiently well defended. Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC, 373 F.3d
372, 435 (3rd Cir. 2004); Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027,1053 (D.C.
Cir. 2002), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (vacating rules
prohibiting broadcast station and cable system ownership in same market and
remanding national broadcast ownership cap); Sinclair Broadcast Group Inc. v.
FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (invaliding limits on ownership of
multiple television broadcast stations within a market); Time Warner v. FCC, 240
F.3d 1126, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (invalidating cable ownership caps and channel
occupancy provisions).
23
See Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13624 (describing public concerns
over localism). In an effort to articulate the localism interest and measure
“localism” performance among broadcasters, the FCC established a Localism Task
Force to hold hearings across the country on the issue, Press Release, “FCC
Chairman Powell Launches ‘Localism in Broadcasting’ Initiative,” at 2-3 (Aug. 20,
2003), at http://www.fcc.gov/localism, and issued a Notice of Inquiry concerning
new localism rules. Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, MB Docket No. 04233 (July 1, 2004).
24
See Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13644 (“We remain firmly
committed to the policy of promoting localism among broadcast outlets.”); Fox
Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1042 (“[T]he public interest has historically
embraced … localism…”). The FCC adopted localism rules for its new low power
radio service. Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205 (1999); 47
C.F.R. § 73.853(b) (limiting initial eligibility for licensees to local entities); 47
C.F.R. § 73.872(b)(1), (3) (giving preference to license applicants that have had an
established community presence for two years and those that pledge “to originate
locally at least eight hours of programming per day” respectively). At the direction
of Congress, the FCC adopted more substantive localism rules when it created a
new low power television service. Establishment of a Class A Television Service,
15 F.C.C.R. 6355, 6363-64 (2000) (requiring new low power television stations to
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The pursuit of speech diversity and localism extends beyond
the regulation of commercial media to support for noncommercial
media, by way of federal subsidies for public broadcast programming
and transmission facilities.25 Public broadcasting was conceived in
large part as a means to satisfy consumer appetites for diverse and
local content that the market overlooked. The public broadcasting
system was assembled in the 1960’s from scattered local stations,
supported principally by state legislatures, universities, and
foundation grants, which provided instructional and other educational
programming.26 In 1965, the independent Carnegie Commission
issued A Program for Action, in which it called for a new system of
“public television.”27 This system would retain its local character,
and its connections with local and regional institutions like
universities.28 It would also be charged with an explicitly diversitybroadcast a minimum amount of programming produced locally as required by 47
U.S.C. § 336(f)(2)). Congress has also tried to advance localism goals in recent
satellite policy. 47 U.S.C. § 338 (2003) (establishing a framework for the
retransmission of local broadcast television signals on satellite).
25
See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 368-69 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2003)). Support for noncommercial media can also
be found in rules requiring satellite broadcasters to reserve four percent of their
channel capacity for “noncommercial programming of an educational or
informational nature.” 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (2003); Implementation of Section 25
of the Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Direct Broadcast
Satellite Public Interest Obligations, 13 FCC Rcd 23254, 23285 (1998). In addition,
cable operators may be required, under their local franchise agreements, to devote a
certain amount of channel capacity and equipment to noncommercial public,
educational, and governmental programming. 47 U.S.C. § 531; 47 C.F.R. § 76.702
(2003).
26
See GEORGE H. GIBSON, PUBLIC BROADCASTING: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, 1912-76 3 (1977). Beginning in the late 1950’s, legislators began to
envision a national network that would knit these stations together, although still
mainly for local educational purposes. In 1957, Senator Warren Magnuson
introduced a bill “to expedite the utilization of television facilities in our schools
and colleges, and in adult training programs.” 104 Cong. Rec. 7141 (1957), quoted
in John E. Burke, The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967: Part I: Historical Origins
and the Carnegie Commission, 6 EDUC. BROAD. REV. 105, 108 (1972). The bill did
not pass, but between 1958 and 1962, Congress held 18 public hearings and four
floor debates on similar legislation. See James Ledbetter, Funding and Economics
of American Public Television, in PUBLIC TELEVISION IN AMERICA 73, 75 (Eli M.
Noam and Jens Waltermann eds., 1998).
27
THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION: PUBLIC TELEVISION, A PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1967)
[hereinafter Carnegie Commission Report].
28
The Carnegie Commission hoped for noncommercial programming that would
“deepen a sense of community in local life… show us our community as it really is
… bring into the home meetings … where people of the community express their
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enhancing mission to develop and distribute distinctive national
programming.29 Finally, as E.B. White captured in correspondence
with the Carnegie Commission, noncommercial television would
“address itself to the ideal of excellence” through programs that
“arouse our dreams [and] satisfy our hunger for beauty,” delivered by
a system capable of becoming “our Lyceum, our Chautauqua, . . . and
our Camelot.”30
The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 closely followed the
Carnegie Commission’s recommendations, incorporating not only
localism and diversity aspirations, but also its insistence on
excellence.31
B. Reactive Policy Thrust: Serving the Consumer
Each of the policies discussed above is implemented through
rules and subsidies aimed at enhancing the array of consumer media
choices. 32 These policies posit the existence of unsatisfied consumer
demand for such media options, to which government then reacts.
Indeed, democratic theories analogizing discourse to market
exchanges support reactive policies that improve service to the
sovereign consumer.
Both diversity and localism policy, and to a lesser extent
noncommercial media policy, are dominated by the “marketplace of
ideas” metaphor of speech competition.33 It is from this metaphor

hopes, their protests, their enthusiasms, and their will.” CARNEGIE COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note xx at 92-99.
29
CARNEGIE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note xx at 3 (finding that “a well-financed
and well-directed educational television system, substantially larger and far more
pervasive and effective than that which now exists in the United States, must be
brought into being if the full needs of the American public are to be served.”).
30
Letter of E.B. White to Stephen White, Assistant to Chairman of the Carnegie
Commission,
Sept.
26,
1966,
at
http://www.current.org/pbpb/carnegie/EBWhiteLetter.html.
31
47 U.S.C. §396(a) (2003) (to further the general welfare, noncommercial
television should be “responsive to the interests of people both in particular
localities and throughout the United States, and which will constitute an expression
of diversity and excellence…”).
32
See, e.g., Media Ownership Order, supra note _ at 13788 (“Ultimately, our goal is
not to prescribe what content citizens access, but to ensure that a wide range of
viewpoints have an opportunity to reach the public.”).
33
The term “marketplace of ideas” is usually attributed to Justice Holmes. Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J. dissenting) (“the best test of
truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market…”). The actual phrase was first used much later. See Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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that the FCC’s efforts to diversify speech radiate.34 Embedded in the
marketplace metaphor is an image of speech consumers and of
speech. Listeners pursue truth much as they might pursue bargains,
turning over a wide range of ideas in competition with each other.35
In this sense, the marketplace analogy is all about an open and
competitive market that can supply consumers with the content they
want.
Notwithstanding the criticism the marketplace metaphor has
endured, policymakers seem largely untroubled by its use.36 More
troubling has been the question of what kind of competition and
quality of antagonism media policy should promote. Attempts to
increase one form of diversity, like independently owned distribution
outlets, might actually decrease diversity along other lines, like
program genre.37 This is the position the media giant Clear Channel
34

See, e.g., Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13627 (the pursuit of a
diverse and robust marketplace of ideas is at “the foundation of our democracy.”);
id. at 13631 (the FCC’s “core policy objective of facilitating robust democratic
discourse in the media” is premised on the notion that “the free flow of ideas undergirds and sustains our system of government.”). The FCC began to use the
marketplace of ideas metaphor with regularity in 1967. See PHILIP M. NAPOLI,
FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS IN THE
REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 109-121 (2001) (reporting results of empirical
study).
35
See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 50
(1989); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30
(1984).
36
For criticism of this metaphor, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 25
- 28, 46-51 (1993) (applying traditional critiques of
free markets to speech markets and proposing a New Deal for speech); Owen M.
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408-1413 (1986)
(criticizing the dominant free speech tradition which equates freedom from
government intrusion with uninhibited and robust debate); Stanley Ingber, The
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1, 48-50 (arguing that
the marketplace metaphor perpetuates a myth of personal autonomy which supports
the status quo and a system that simply fine-tunes differences among elites).
37
This is because efficient combinations of media outlets may create the conditions
for genre diversity. See Benjamin J. Bates & Todd Chambers, The Economic Basis
for Radio Deregulation, 12 J. MEDIA ECONS. 19, 23 (1999); BRUCE M. OWEN &
STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 65-68 (1992) (outlining Peter Steiner’s
model of viewer preference in which competing media outlets duplicate
programming to capture the largest audience in contrast to a monopolist which
would differentiate media offerings); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and
Democracy: A Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1936-1951 (2000)
(discussing Steiner’s and other economic modeling of the effects of concentrated
distribution markets on program diversity); Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show, 80
MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1449 (1996) (“In an increasingly diverse landscape of leisure
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takes, for example, when confronting criticism that its ownership of
some 1200 radio stations has reduced variety in radio content. The
efficiencies of concentrated ownership, the company claims, have
allowed it to increase programming genres that the public demands.38
While some listeners might miss the idiosyncratic voice, most
listeners are better satisfied.39 Wal-Mart can make the same claim as
it out-competes small businesses that are diversely owned, but
provide a narrower range of products. The important aspect of this
debate for our purposes is that it turns on different dimensions of
consumer satisfaction.
The same reactive thrust has dominated localism policy.
Local stations are required, in an undefined and largely unenforced
way, to satisfy consumer demand for difference.40 Indeed, in this
respect, localism policy is really a subset of diversity policy. Policy
interventions to ensure that local media outlets respond to community
interests are simply another way of increasing the number of
competing perspectives available to viewers – particularly those
perspectives within distinct geographic markets that may be lost in the

options, only concentrated broadcasters can attain the scale needed to garner and
market” diverse and desirable programming.).
38
For an account of this debate, see Gregory M. Prindle, No Competition: How
Radio Consolidation Has Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 279, 313-321 (2003). The FCC itself
has concluded that more concentrated outlet ownership might produce more genre
diversity. Review of Commission Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting,
10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3551 (1995) (“where there are competing parties, each of their
strategies would be to go after the median viewer with the ‘greatest common
denominator’ programming…[whereas] where one party owned all the stations in a
market, its strategy would likely be to put on a sufficiently varied programming
menu in each time slot to appeal to all substantial interests.”).
39
The courts have criticized the FCC for failing to make explicit tradeoffs between
different kinds of diversity. Schurz Communications v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 10541055 (7th Cir. 1992) (remanding financial interest and syndication rules as arbitrary
and capricious in part because the FCC did not explain how rules designed to
increase source diversity would enhance program diversity); Sinclair Broad. Group
v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (the FCC
“should define its diversity goal, and in doing so explain the distinctions (and
interaction) between programming diversity and viewpoint diversity, rather than
simply quoting boilerplate on the ‘elusiveness’ of diversity.”).
40
Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13644 (“The Commission decided long
ago that local station licensees have a responsibility to air programming that is
suited to the tastes and needs of their community”) (citing Deregulation of Radio,
84 FCC 2d 968, 981 (1960)).
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national din.41 Consider, for example, the early structural approach to
localism epitomized in the requirement that the FCC distribute
broadcast licenses to as many communities as possible.42 This
elevation of cities and towns, at the expense of larger political or
territorial units, reflects the early republican belief in disbursed power
as a guarantor of liberty.43 In media as in politics, the hope was that
devolution of control would promote responsiveness to the will of the
people.44 After experimenting with more substantive rules, discussed
below, the FCC has returned to this structural approach over the past
several decades. At the heart of this approach is the notion that some
combination of market pressures and licensee responsibility will
produce a satisfying local service, so long as the market is not unduly
concentrated.45
41

See Sixth Report and Order on Television Allocations, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952)
(localism policies “protect[] the interests of the public residing in smaller cities and
rural areas more adequately than any other system.”).
42
47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (directing the FCC to “make such distribution of licenses,
frequencies, hours of operation, and power among the several States and
communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio
service to each of the same.”). See generally FCC Policy Statement on
Comparative Hearings, 1 F.C.C. 2d 393 (1965).
43
See Andrew Calabrese, Why Localism? Communication Technology and the
Shifting Scales of Political Community, in COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY 251,
253 (Gregory J. Shepherd et al., ed., 2001) (“U.S. communications policy has
always been nominally committed to the idea of localism as a Jeffersonian-style
means of promoting decentralized public discourse about matters of social and
political consequence.”); ROBERT B. HOROWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY
REFORM: THE DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 174 (1989)
(localism was a “surprisingly conscious policy” connected with the Jeffersonian
idea of small-town America). But see Office of Technology Assessment, Critical
Connections: Communication for the Future 148-9 (1992) (noting that America’s
early legislators thought that “media subsidies” should sponsor the distribution of
post and newspapers to foster the development of a national identity through
communications).
44
For a discussion of localism as the core value of federalism, see Frank B. Cross,
The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20-25 (2002); Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 703 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (lauding “local control over local decisions”). See also
MONROE E. PRICE, TELEVISION, THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 215
(1995) (localism policies were “designed to reinforce a vision of American life and
imagination in which the geographical community had dignity.”).
45
See Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, MB Docket No. 04-233, ¶1 (July 1,
2004) (in the 1980’s, the FCC “found that market forces, in an increasingly
competitive environment, would encourage broadcasters” to serve local
communities). The Supreme Court has endorsed indirectly the structural approach
to localism in upholding the statutory requirement that cable operators retransmit
broadcast signals within their local communities. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC,
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The dominance of the structural, reactive approach to localism
can be seen in the recent battles over local television ownership
restrictions. Those opposing these restrictions attempted to show that
the market ensured responsiveness to local consumer demand for such
products as local news.46 This is because local news is often the most
profitable part of a station’s operations.47 In other words, the stations
are meaningfully local because they are responsive to consumer
demand for the local. Supporters of the ownership restrictions have
fought on the same grounds, arguing that the rules are necessary to
satisfy consumer desires.48 The FCC too has come to equate localism

520 U.S. 180, 194 (1997) (emphasizing that cognizable governmental interest was
in promoting local control of the broadcast transmission service, not local content
per se). But see 520 U.S. 180, 234-35 (O’Connor J., dissenting) (arguing that the
asserted governmental interest was a “content-based preference for broadcast
programming” that is local, not a content-neutral preference for local control).
46
Comments of Fox Entertainment Group, et al. in 2002 Biennial Regulatory
Review
Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB Docket No. 02-277, at 35-37 (F.C.C.
filed Jan. 2, 2003); Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13838-13839;
Thomas C. Spavins, Loretta Denison, Scott Roberts, Jane Frenette, The
Measurement of Local Television News and Public Affairs Programs (2002), at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A12.doc
(FCC
commissioned study finding that network-owned stations air 23% more local news
and public affairs programming per week than independent stations); Media
Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13678-93 (discussing results of FCCcommissioned study).
47
See ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION
111 (1973) (showing how local news is popular and cheap to produce, making it
highly profitable); Vernon Stone, News Operations at U.S. TV Stations, at
http://www.missouri/edu/~jourvs/tvops.html. But see Reply Comments of The
National Association of Broadcasters and Network Affiliated Stations Alliance in
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review
Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB Docket
No. 02-277, 46-55 (F.C.C. filed Feb. 3, 2003) (identifying shortcomings of studies
suggesting that network-owned stations outperform independent stations on local
news).
48
See, e.g., Comments of The National Association of Broadcasters and Network
Affiliated Stations Alliance in 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review Review of the
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to
Section 202, MB Docket No. 02-277, 39-40 (F.C.C. filed Dec. 9, 2002). See
generally, Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating the FCC’s National Television
Ownership Cap: What’s Bad for Broadcasting Is Good for the Country, at 18-27
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing affiliated stations’
arguments that media consolidation discourages them from being more responsive
to local tastes).
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policy with support of programming that has popular appeal within a
local market.49
It might be supposed that the development of a
noncommercial alternative to consumer-driven broadcast media
would not emphasize consumer sovereignty. But today’s system of
public broadcasting does. The public television system proposed by
the Carnegie Commission was meant to identify demand that
commercial television did not serve. Because commercial television
“is obliged for the most part to search for the uniformities within the
general public, and to apply its skills to satisfy the uniformities it has
found,” the Carnegie Commission thought it was likely to amass
audiences by muting, rather than satisfying, differences.50 The Public
Broadcasting Act followed up on this insight by making it a policy
goal to serve “unserved and underserved” audiences.51 In other
words, public television was to enhance the marketplace of ideas,
with its emphasis on customer service, by going beyond the market to
deliver communications that market exchanges should have, but failed
to, produce.52
As discussed below, it is in the area of noncommercial
television policy that the inadequacy of the consumer satisfaction
model is most evident. The problems are exposed whenever the
nominally underserved audiences that non-market media target are,
for practical purposes, non-existent audiences. The limitations of the
consumer sovereignty model are evident in diversity and localism
policy as well. Policy aspirations require, and policy has sometimes
49

See Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13755-60, 13839-42 (relying
heavily on ratings for local news in assessing the impact of television ownership
rules on localism). Taken to its extreme, the procedural or responsive approach to
localism would not rule out a decision by local broadcasters to provide their
communities with a wholly national program service if that is what the population
desired. It is difficult to imagine the persistence of the localism principle under
such circumstances. Indeed, the tendency to equate localism with local content (and
particularly news and public affairs) has proved to be irresistible. See e.g., Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (identifying broadcast coverage
of matters of local concern as objective of broadcast localism policy); NBC v. U.S.,
319 U.S. 190, 192 (1943)(equating local control with a local program service that is
a “vital part of community life.”).
50
CARNEGIE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note xx at 13-14.
51
47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(6) (2003).
52
Upon signing the Public Broadcasting Act in 1967, President Johnson adverted to
the democratic theory behind the marketplace of ideas, remarking that “at its best,
public television would help make our Nation a replica of the old Greek
marketplace, where public affairs took place in view of all the citizens.” Gary O.
Larson, Fulfilling the Promise: Public Broadcasting in the Digital Age (Center for
Media Education 1998), at http://www.cme.org/publications/fulfill.html.
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revealed, a more proactive approach to the provision and consumption
of media products that transcends consumer sovereignty.
C. Proactive Policy Thrust: Altering the Consumer
Most media policy criticism has focused on the technical
implementation of diversity, localism and non-market goals.53 But
there is a more important question. This is to what extent media
policy, however implemented, should be proactive as well as reactive
with respect to media consumption. To what extent should media
policy take into account not just what consumers currently want, but
what democracy needs?54 These needs include common exposure to a
broad array of ideas, and public elevation through especially excellent
programming.
1. Common Exposure
As we saw above, both diversity and localism policies pursue
greater choice. And yet, the objectives of the “marketplace of ideas”
are not met merely with more content. Robust debate depends on a
trade in ideas. And trade requires that speech consumers be exposed
in common to the abundance of ideas that the marketplace yields. It
requires water cooler conversation over diverse viewpoints, not
atomized consumption. To the extent that consumers do not want to
be exposed to difference they do not seek, interventions in media
markets to encourage exposure are proactive, not reactive.
That communication should integrate listeners as well as
satisfy demand for speech products is an idea with roots in both
communication and political theory. What James Cary has called the
ritual view of communication relates communication with “‘sharing,’
‘participation,’ ‘association,’ ‘fellowship,’ and ‘the possession of a

53

For a critique of the government’s diffuse approach to diversity, see Ronald J.
Krotoszynski and Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power,
Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 818 (2000)
(“The [FCC’s] inability to define coherently the concept of diversity has resulted in
a confused mix of regulatory policies – a regulatory gumbo that lacks even the
pretense of some overarching goal or objective.”). See also NAPOLI, supra note xx
[Foundations] at 135-146. For a critique of localism policy, see HOROWITZ, supra
note xx at 155 (calling localism is an “ambiguous policy goal” leading to “a kind of
mushy policy foundation”); Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment:
An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L. J. 899, 938 (1998); Tom A. Collins, Local
Service Concept in Broadcasting: An Evaluation and Recommendation for Change,
65 IOWA L. REV. 553, 635 (1980). For an economic critique of particular localism
regulations, see Christopher S. Yoo, supra note xx [Rethinking the Commitment] at
1677-82; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 123-4.
54
This is essentially the question posed in C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens
Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1998).
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common faith.’”55 Communication is thus embedded, lexically and
conceptually, in community, communion, and common. It is
“directed not toward the extension of messages in space but toward
the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting
information but the representation of shared beliefs.”56
One of the chief exponents of this view of communication was
John Dewey. For Dewey, communication was a defense against
isolation and a force for solidarity.57 He wrote that “consensus
demands communication” because “communication is the way in
which [people] come to possess things in common.”58 Civic
republican theory nests Dewey’s communitarian sentiments within the
discourse of free speech. To oversimplify, the hallmark of a civic
republic, also referred to as a deliberative democracy, is rational
deliberation among citizens emerging into a consensus that drives
55

JAMES W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE: ESSAYS ON MEDIA AND
SOCIETY 18 (1988) (opposing the ritual view of communication to the transmission
view of communication which conceives of communication like railroads and
highways as tools to control far-flung territories).
56
Id.
57
A number of contemporary media scholars share this perspective. See, e.g.,
PRICE, supra note xx at 216 (“While it is popular to regard expansions of freedom
as the consequence of increased choice, and to think of choice as the archetypal
prerequisite for increased liberty, [the loss of a sense of place] represents
deprivation as well as growth for our democratic processes and notions of identity, a
geography of anomie as well as a geography of opportunity.”); Gigi B. Sohn &
Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Broadcast Licensees and Localism: At Home in the
“Communications Revolution,” 47 FED. COMM. L. J. 383, 388 (1994) (arguing that
localism and diversity policies serve “basic human needs… to care and to have
pride in the places they have chosen to live in and become a part of… to not only
know their neighbors, but to have some thread of commonality with them…[and] to
insure that they do not become just another faceless name in a faceless society.”).
58
JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 5-6 (1916). See also JOHN DEWEY,
THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 219 (1927) (“We lie, as Emerson said, in the lap of
an immense intelligence. But that intelligence is dormant and its communications
are broken, inarticulate and faint until it possess the local community as its
medium.”). Concern about the impact of media consolidation on the ability of
communities to forge a shared culture was prominent in the debate over Clear
Channel’s dominance of the local radio market. See Broadcast Ownership En Banc,
Richmond, Virginia, 2003 FCC LEXIS 2010 (April 15, 2003) *122 (Statement of
David Croteau) (“in its embrace of nationally syndicated personalities to the
exclusion of locals, Clear Channel has made it clear that it has no use for
[Richmond’s] talents, viewpoints and flavor.”). See also Comments of Future of
Music Coalition, Radio Deregulation: Has it Served Citizens and Musicians? in
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review
Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB Docket
No. 02-277, at 79-80 (F.C.C. filed Nov. 20, 2002).
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public policy.59 The idea is that a common culture can emerge within
a free and heterogeneous population only through exposure to, and
discussion of, difference.60 Such rational exchange requires a shared
vocabulary and common intellectual heritage, which the media is
influential in providing. There must, in other words, be exposure to
difference as well as satisfaction of appetites for difference.
This distinction between exposure and satisfaction recognizes
that speech markets are not like widget markets. Unlike widgets,
most utterances are not substitutable.61 Two expressions will not
compete unless the listener thinks they are close enough substitutes to
compare them, or the opportunity and other costs of listening are low.
As content options increase, so do the opportunity costs of listening to
speech that the listener does not think will satisfy. The listener in
effect has the choice between perusing the aisles of a supermarket,
where diverse goods are all available, or making a beeline to a
specialty shop stocked with just what she wants. If the “more” that
diversity policy engenders simply fractures audience attention among
multiple specialty shops, then audience members are less likely to
share a common media culture. The civic republican ideal rejects this
specialty shop model of diversity. Instead, the ideal is diverse
expression whose “more” destroys the homogeneity of the consumed,
not shared consumption patterns. In other words, the object of
diversity should be to increase exposure to non-substitutable speech
utterances in the supermarket, thereby increasing tolerance of

59

See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948) (identifying the importance of free speech in the education of
a citizenry capable of effective democratic participation); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. J. 283 (1996). See also
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (federal
“communications policy seeks to facilitate the public discussion and informed
deliberation which … democratic government presupposes”) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part). But see Edward Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 711, 749-54 (arguing that deliberation is an anachronistic concept in
our democracy and is not central to our political process).
60
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 186-87 (1997)
(arguing that democracy depends on the exchange of ideas among its citizens from
which collective decisions can emerge); SUNSTEIN, supra note xx [DEMOCRACY] at
241-252; JOHN B. THOMSON, THE MEDIA AND MODERNITY 255-258 (1995). For a
general exposition of civic republican theory, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993).
61
See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
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difference and creating the “solidarity goods” that bind citizens
together.62
It is not just in communitarian or civic republican traditions
that one can locate aspirations for media policy that transcend
consumer satisfaction. These aspirations exist too within the liberal
traditions more closely associated with the marketplace metaphor. At
the surface, the value of speech diversity is the value of difference,
not consensus.63 And yet, robust democratic debate depends upon
exchanges, which in turn require a common vocabulary and shared
content. This centripetal thrust within diversity policy is merely
reactive, as I have defined it, to the extent that citizens want to
consume the diverse expression on which democracy depends. But if
they do not initially demand it, and they can easily avoid it, the
marketplace of ideas will not host debate without proactive efforts to
expose citizens to shared diversity.
In his gloss on the traditional liberal theory underlying the
marketplace of ideas metaphor, Ed Baker exposes the fissures
between diversity and debate. Like traditional liberal theorists, Baker
embraces the competitive jousting among plural conceptions of the
good. But he recognizes the danger of the specialty shop of ideas to
democratic debate: that consumers may avoid the competitive arena,
demanding only the sort of speech that confirms their existing
viewpoints. To address this danger, Baker formulates a theory of
“complex democracy” in which speech exposes citizens to difference
at the same time that difference is exposed in speech.64 According to
this conception, the ideal marketplace attracts a varied public with a
wide range of wares, inviting comparisons between the known and the
unknown.
Bridging the liberal and civic republican conceptions of
speech diversity is Jürgan Habermas’ depiction of the public sphere.65
62

See SUNSTEIN, supra note xx [REPUBLIC.COM] at 92-96 (discussing media
products as solidarity goods). For a more detailed discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein
& Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Solidarity Goods, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 129 (2001). Others
have offered similar views in the context of media and online consumption. See,
e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION (1999); NEIL POSTMAN,
AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH (1985).
63
See Robert M. Entman & Steven S. Wildman, Reconciling Economic and NonEconomic Perspectives on Media Policy: Transcending the “Marketplace of Ideas”,
42 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 1, 5-19 (1992).
64
See BAKER, supra note xx [Media, Markets] at 142-147 (contending that plural
conceptions of the good in a complex democracy are best formed through
deliberative exchange with others holding similar and competing conceptions).
65
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (trans. Thomas
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Habermas’ public sphere is a space where different viewpoints jostle
for public consumption on the basis of their public appeal.66 In this
sense, the public sphere celebrates the difference and conflict that is.
Yet the public sphere is also a forum for deliberation and the forging
of consensus.67 It aspires to what might be, and can only be if citizens
engage with each other and consume ideas they might not seek. The
public sphere thus becomes a forum for intellectual exchange that at
once satisfies diverse tastes and supports common norms.68
Given the First Amendment constraints on policy, it is not
surprising that these aspirational elements of media theory have been
de-emphasized.69 What efforts there were to actualize the aspirational
in media regulations are now mostly dead. The FCC’s erstwhile
“fairness doctrine,” for example, took seriously the importance of
consumer exposure to difference for the satisfaction of democratic
goals. By requiring broadcast licensees to present opposing
Burger 1989). For a theoretical examination of the impact of Habermas’ work on
media policy, see generally PETER DAHLGREN, TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE (1995).
66
Like the marketplace, the public sphere is a space that caters to public desires,
except that it is distinct “from both the economy and the state.” Nicholas Garnham,
The Media and the Public Sphere, in COMMUNICATING POLITICS: MASS
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 41 (Peter Golding, et al. eds.,
1986). See also PRICE, supra note xx at 21-40. Closely related to the public sphere is
the concept of civil society, championed by communitarian theorists like Michael
Walzer and Amitai Etzioni. The civil society, like the public sphere, is a web of
social relationships and institutions that are neither economic nor political and that
serve to strengthen the ties that bind citizens together. See, e.g., Michael Walzer,
The Civil Society Argument, in DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 106-7
(Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992) (arguing for a “critical associationalism” that recaptures
the “density of associational life” and supports “what is local, specific, contingent”
in a democratic state. See also AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE:
COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 102 (1996) (media use
should be integrated into, and recognize norms of, community).
67
See R. Randall Rainey & William Rehg, The Marketplace of Ideas, the Public
Interest, and Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media: Implications of
Habermas’ Theory of Democracy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1957-1962 (1996)
(showing how Habermas’ account of political deliberation includes both the drive
for consensus in the common good and bargaining among particular, irreconcilable
interests). See also Baker, supra note xx at 147 (suggesting that his own construct
of a complex democracy applies Habermas’ theory of community in conflict).
68
Some theorists question the vitality of the public sphere concept in contemporary
society. See, e.g., Todd Gitlin, Public Sphere or Public Sphericules? in MEDIA,
RITUAL AND IDENTITY 168, 172 (Tamar Liebes & James Curren ed., 1998)
(suggesting that the concept of a unitary public sphere has little relevance for an
information culture marked by “secession, exclusion and segmentation … targeted
markets and consumption subcultures.”).
69
See infra notes xx and accompanying text.

22

Media Policy Out of the Box

[Vol.__:__]

viewpoints on matters of public importance, the doctrine tried to
increase diversity on each channel, not just across the sum of
channels.70 In other words, it took the supermarket approach to media
exposure.71 Policies directed at increasing independent television
production prior to the mid-1990’s reflected a similar concern with
exposing viewers to difference on all channels, rather than simply
enabling difference across channels.72
Aspirations for common exposure to content are faintly
evident in localism policy. Arguably, the stated objective of localism
policy itself, which is that broadcast stations should serve the “needs
and interests” of their local communities, is aspirational in its
reference to “needs” as well as “interests.”73 If needs and interests are
70

See Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1974). For examples of
fairness doctrine cases, see, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), aff’d on rehearing, 425 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that station must air pro-integration programming if it
aired pro-segregation programming); Complaint of Representative Patsy Mink, 59
F.C.C.2d 987 (1976) (holding that licensee must air coverage of environmental
aspects of strip mining if it reported on pending federal legislation on issue).
71
Another example of this approach can be found in the rules requiring broadcasters
to afford “equal opportunities” to political candidates entitled by statute to
reasonable access of broadcast facilities. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315(a), 315(b)
(2003). An equal opportunity is measured by the likelihood of, not just the
opportunity for, audience exposure. Thus, a candidate is entitled to obtain time
within a program that has equivalent ratings to that of his opponent. Law of
Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting: A Political Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476, ¶¶
54-56 (1984).
72
For several decades, the financial interest and syndication rules limited the
ownership interests that broadcast networks could have in studios that produced
broadcast content in order to create greater diversity in the source of broadcast
programming. The rules were codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1970) and
eliminated by Review of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 10 F.C.C.R.
12165 (1995). See also Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations with Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television
Broadcasting, Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 400 (1970), aff'd sub nom. Mt.
Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971) (justifying financial
interest and syndication rules on grounds that “[d]iversity of programs and
development of diverse and antagonistic sources of program service are essential to
[each] broadcast licensee's discharge of his duty as trustee for the public in the
operation of his channel.”) (emphasis added).
73
See Media Ownership Order, supra note xx (referring to the “needs and interests”
of local communities 16 times without clear explication of how those needs and
interests should be defined). This phrasing seems to descend from language first
used by the Federal Radio Commission, the predecessor to the FCC. Great Lakes
Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 34 (1929) (ordering radio stations to satisfy “the
tastes, needs, and desires of all substantial groups among the listening public…”).
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distinct, and they do not have to be, then the difference may be that
interests are self-defining while needs are not. The use of the word
“needs” evokes democratic theories about the kind of
communications environment that is necessary for robust democratic
debate and reasoned decisionmaking.74 Consonant with this
interpretation, localism policies adopted between 1960 and the early
1980’s required broadcasters actively to seek out what their
communities needed,75 and established “guidelines” for supplying the
“major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest.”76
Having made the determination that local content, and not just local
control, was important for satisfying community needs, the FCC used
the broadcast license renewal process to privilege those stations that
aired designated amounts of specific types of local programming.77
Other policy interventions supported the production of local content
for which there was negligible or at least insufficient demand.78
74

See, e.g., Broadcasting in America and the FCC’s License Renewal Process: An
Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1968)(“the greatest challenge before the
American people today is the challenge of restoring and reinvigorating local
democracy…[which can only be met by] a working system of local broadcast media
actively serving the needs of the community for information about its affairs, . . .
and allowing all to confront the listening public with their problems and their
proposals.”).
75
Primer of Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by Broad. Applicants, 27 F.C.C. 2d
650, 651 (1971) (requiring broadcasters to follow procedures in ascertaining from
community leaders and other members of the public what kind of programming
would best serve). The ascertainment requirement was later eliminated. Revision
of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and
Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1075
(1984).
76
Report & Statement of Policy Res: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry,
44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314 (1960) (listing 14 elements including the “opportunity for
local self-expression, …the development and use of local talent, …[and] public
affairs programs…”).
77
Amendment of Section 0.281 of the Commission’s Rules: Delegations of
Authority to the Chief, Broadcast Bureau, 59 F.C.C. 2d 491, 493 (1976) (calling on
local stations to air at least “five percent total local programming, five percent
informational (news plus public affairs programming), [and] ten percent total nonentertainment programming.”). See also Formulation of Policies and Rules Relating
to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, Third Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 4 F.C.C.R. 6363, n.11 (1989) (identifying service of local
needs and local production as factors contributing to the prospects for license
renewals).
78
This approach is evident in rules that protect local broadcasters’ contractual rights
to exclusive transmission of syndicated programming within their local markets.
Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004, 1023
(1979) (“[O]ur concern with localism… may be characterized as a concern with
externalities – that is, the true value of local news and public affairs programming
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Although policy has clearly moved away from the aspirational
elements of diversity and localism, the tension between reactive and
proactive policy approaches is evident in today’s debates. In localism
policy, recent FCC actions suggest that substantive policy in keeping
with proactive approaches may be heading for a revival.79 The same
can be said for diversity policy. Take, for example, the measurement
of diversity. In conformance with a procedural, reactive approach, the
FCC has in the past simply counted the stalls in the market, looking at
how many independent television stations and other outlets are
available to the public, without inquiring into actual media usage and
exposure patterns.80 An alternative would be to assess diversity by
what media people actually consume.81 The FCC struggled recently
to combine the two approaches in constructing a quasi-scientific
“Diversity Index” to guide broadcast ownership deregulation.82 It
measured actual consumption patterns, as opposed to mere
availability, for some purposes,83 but not for other purposes.84 This
may not be reflected in the number of individuals who view it or the value they
place on it but in the value it has to our society as a whole and especially in the
functioning of our democratic institutions.”); 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.122-124 (2003).
79
Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, FCC No. 04-129 (July 1, 2004) at ¶¶ 1114 (asking whether the FCC should impose more substantive localism requirements
on broadcasters rather than relying on structural controls and market pressure).
80
See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §73.3555 (2003) (restricting ownership of multiple broadcast
stations based on the number of independently owned outlets in the market). Such
usage patterns might be measured by an outlet’s market share within a medium or
by a more sophisticated market analysis by particular program type, such as news
and information, prime time, etc….
81
For scholarship endorsing this direction, see Philip Napoli, Deconstructing the
Diversity Principle, 48 J. OF COMMUN. 7 (1999).
82
The FCC developed a “Diversity Index” to measure “the availability of outlets
that contribute to viewpoint diversity in local media markets.” Media Ownership
Order, supra note xx at 13775. The Diversity Index, which is loosely based on the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission use to analyze mergers by summing the square of market shares to
yield a total level of market concentration, calculates each media owner’s share of
media outlets within a market, adjusted to reflect each medium’s share of the total
media market. Id. at 13789-90. See also Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC,
373 F.3d 372, 404 (3rd Cir. 2004).
83
The Diversity Index considered actual consumption patterns in creating the
universe of media outlets that would be included in the Index, for example
discounting cable as a source of local news and information because consumer
surveys suggested scant reliance on cable, while counting the Internet because
consumer surveys suggested the opposite. See Media Ownership Order, supra note
xx at 13778 (“[O]ur method for measuring viewpoint diversity weights outlets
based on the way people actually use them rather than what is actually available as a
local news source.”). See also Prometheus Radio Project, et al v. FCC, 373 F.3d
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inconsistency in the treatment of audience exposure was partially
responsible for the Third Circuit’s remand of the Diversity Index and
associated rules.85 As the FCC comes to rework these rules and the
underlying Diversity Index, it will have to take a more coherent
approach to the consumption, as well as the availability of, diverse
expression.
2. Public Elevation
The proactive component of media policy is, unsurprisingly,
most evident in support for noncommercial media. Here, the
aspiration is not only for media consumers to be exposed to content in
common, but for them to be exposed to content that elevates or
educates. It is this goal that has tagged public television with the
“elitist” label for much of its existence, even though most American
households watch at least some public television.86 Although too
politically incendiary to state baldly, the goal of elevation figured
prominently in both the precursors to the Carnegie Commission
Report and subsequent policy enactments.87
372, 405-06 (2004) (criticizing the FCC for failing to explain why Internet news
consumption should count when the news consumed is typically sourced by
television and newspaper news operations).
84
The FCC abandoned its focus on consumption when it came time to analyze the
diversity of outlets within a medium. It considered all television stations, for
example, equally significant sources of local news even if they broadcast very little
news or garnered very small market shares. Media Ownership Order, supra note xx
at 13786 (“We have chosen the availability measure, which is implemented by
counting the number of independent outlets available for a particular medium and
assuming that all outlets within a medium have equal shares. In the context of
evaluating viewpoint diversity, this approach reflects a measure of the likelihood
that some particular viewpoint might be censored or foreclosed, i.e., blocked from
transmission to the public.”).
85
Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 404-410 (3rd Cir. 2004).
See also Cheryl A. Leanza, Monolith or Mosaic: Can the Federal Communications
Commission Legitimately Pursue a Repetition of Local Content at the Expense of
Local Diversity, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 597, 607-611 (2004); Mark Cooper,
Abracadabra! Hocus-Pocus! Making Media Market Power Disappear with the
FCC’s
Diversity
Index,
at
5
(July
2003),
at
http://www.consumersunion.org/abrafinal721.pdf (criticizing the Diversity Index
for equalizing market shares among media outlets within each class of media).
86
According to Nielsen ratings, more than 70% of all U.S. television households
and about 144 million people tune into public television during the average month.
See PBS Audience, http://www.pbs.org/aboutpbs/aboutpbs_corp_audience.html.
87
See supra notes xx. The same could not be said in Britain, at least until relatively
recently. The BBC started as an unabashedly elite institution intent on providing
the public what the elite thought it needed. See MICHAEL TRACEY, THE DECLINE
AND FALL OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING 21-25 (1998) (citing an influential
1962 report ascribing to public television the “power to influence values and moral
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The most important such precursor was the influential report
of the post-war Commission on Freedom of the Press. This
Commission, chaired by former University of Chicago Chancellor
Robert M. Hutchins, was established to explore dissatisfaction with
the commercial press.88 Drawing on the liberal theory underlying
speech diversity goals, the Commission argued that democratic life
requires a “public mentality … accustomed to the noise and confusion
of clashing opinions”.89 Drawing on civic republican theory, the
Commission also located democratic strength in mutual
understanding.90 The media, it concluded, have an obligation to foster
such understanding and “to elevate rather than to degrade” the
public.91
These same ideas formed the intellectual backbone of the
Carnegie Commission Report, which envisioned a public service
media that would support high quality communication.92 This
emphasis on quality and excellence connects public service media to
the notion of “merit goods.” Often used in connection with the
performing and fine arts, merit goods refer to products that the market
would not produce but should be made available because they do
people good.93
standards”); IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING THE AUDIENCE 101-103, 108-112
(1991). In the 1970’s, the BBC evolved into a media institution that tried to reflect
society rather than to mold it. See ANG at 115 (observing that in the 1960’s and
1970’s, the metaphor for public service broadcasting changed from that of a ship
forging a cultural course to that of a mirror reflecting honestly a cultural truth).
88
COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS
(1947). Other members of the Commission included First Amendment scholar
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., philosopher Reinhold Nieburh, and historian Arthur M.
Schlesinger.
89
Id. at 91-92.
90
See id. at 68 (finding democratic infirmities in “the perpetuation of
misunderstanding among widely scattered groups whose only contact is through
these media.”).
91
Id. at 92.
92
See supra note xx. See also Testimony of Ken Burns, Florentine Films, before
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp. (July 13, 2004), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1265&wit_id=3648
(in
defending the mission of public service media, contending that the “pursuit of
happiness” requires “an active involvement of the mind in the higher aspects of
human endeavor – namely education, music, the arts and history – a marketplace of
ideas.”)
93
See Richard A. Musgrave, Merit Goods in RATIONALITY, INDIVIDUALISM AND
PUBLIC POLICY 207-210 (Geoffrey Brennan & Cliff Walsh eds., 1990); DICK
NETZER, THE SUBSIDIZED MUSE, 16-24 (1978) (arguing for art subsidies because
society benefits from artistic production even if there are small audiences). See also
GILLIAN DOYLE, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA ECONOMICS 66, 162 (2002). For
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What the Public Television Act did not address, nor has any
subsequent policy, are the irreconcilability between the provision of
merit goods and the satisfaction of public desires, between
“popularity and publicness” in public service media.94 Public
broadcasting is expected to provide alternatives to the market to
satisfy the aspirations of a democracy.95 And yet it is also expected to
mirror the existing orientation of audiences towards particular kinds
of media products. The Carnegie Commission’s attempt to meld
audience satisfaction with audience elevation has never worked very
well for public television’s critics.96
The need to better theorize the relationship between
consumers and media policy is nowhere more important than in the
area of media subsidies where the entire enterprise rises or falls on
this relationship. Government intervention in media markets depends
on a conception of why the market might fail to deliver what people
want or what democracy needs.

criticism of the notion of public service media as a merit good, see JOHN KEANE,
THE MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY 117-126 (1991) (arguing that the terms “quality” and
“excellence” cannot be defined and “allow the market liberals to elope with the old
vocabulary of ‘liberty of the press.’”); MICHAEL TRACEY, THE DECLINE AND FALL
OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING 278 (1998) (arguing that public media’s pursuit
of quality presupposes understanding and empathy, but society has now been so
“coarsened… by sheer mediocrity, the flight from excellence, and the enthronement
of the trivial, the superficial, the ghoulish in much market-driven television” that
this level of understanding and empathy no longer exists.).
94
Willard D. Rowland, Jr., The Institution of U.S. Public Broadcasting, in PUBLIC
TELEVISION IN AMERICA 34 (Eli M. Noam & Jens Waltermann ed., 1993). See also
BARRY DORNFELD, PRODUCING PUBLIC TELEVISION, PRODUCING PUBLIC CULTURE
41 (1998) (noting “[t]he tension between the market and the ‘nonmarket,’ the hybrid
space that public television occupies in the United States…”).
95
Rowland, supra note xx at 14.
96
See Howard A. White, Fine Tuning the Federal Government's Role in Public
Broadcasting, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 491, 501-503, 513 (1994) (discussing
Congressional attempts to eliminate funding for public television and criticizing
public broadcastings’ over reliance on its most popular programming); Chris
Johnson, Federal Support of Public Broadcasting: Not Quite What LBJ Had in
Mind, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 135, 138-140 (2000) (criticizing public television
for political bias and a failure to garner a larger audience). The development of
alternative non-commercial ratings standards to credential lightly-viewed
programming might have resolved some of the tensions for a service that is
supposed to satisfy demand too insignificant for commercial services. But this
alternative did not materialize, and presents its own problems for a publiclysubsidized media service. E.B. White’s vision of a public service medium that
could broadcast to the few (in many instances) in the hopes of influencing the many
is simply not politically viable.
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D. Narrow and Broad Market Failures
Building on the distinction between reactive and proactive
policy goals, this last subsection provides a vocabulary for addressing
the impact of market developments on policy goals in the digital
mediascape.
Since the operative principle of the marketplace is to satisfy
public demand, reactive media policy that seeks to better serve the
sovereign consumer is justified only in cases where business
arrangements have blunted the force of consumer preferences. I am
calling these failures of the market to serve consumer welfare,
identified in Section III, “narrow market failures.” Media policy
interventions to address these kinds of failures are designed merely to
correct the market, thereby enhancing consumer sovereignty.
Even a perfectly functioning market will not meet the
aspirational goals of media policy. It will not serve the public welfare
that is external to markets by accounting for the value programming
can add to civic life through increased education, political
engagement, or social solidarity. These are what I am calling “broad
market failures.” To the extent that media policy steps in to address
broad market failures by facilitating or compelling the production of
this kind of programming, it is not a market corrective but a market
supplement.97
The notion of broad market failure requires more discussion.
The argument for market supplementation is premised on the ability
of certain media products to generate positive externalities.98 Positive
externalities exist whenever A’s consumption produces value created
by B for which B is not compensated.99 For example, let us assume
97

This argument might also be characterized, not as one concerning market failure,
but as one concerning “market reach” as Owen Fiss has termed it: “The market
might be splendid for some purposes but not for others. It might be an effective
institution for producing cheap and varied consumer goods and for providing
essential services (including entertainment) but not for producing the kind of debate
that constantly renews the capacity of a people for self determination.” Owen Fiss,
Why the State? 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987).
98
See, e.g., BAKER, supra note xx [Media, Markets] at 41-62 (considering positive
externalities generated by media including the quality of public opinion and
political participation, public interactions, exposing and deterring abuses of power,
and audience impact on cultural products available to non-audience members). For
a good general discussion of the externalities of information, see Daniel Farber,
Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105
HARV. L. REV. 554, 558-62 (1991).
99
James T. Hamilton, Private Interests in ‘Public Interest’ Programming: An
Economic Assessment of Broadcaster Incentives, 45 DUKE L. J. 1177, 1179-80
(1996) (presenting a more complex formula).
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that exposing children to educational television programming
produces a range of benefits.100 Some of these benefits will be purely
private, like the personal enjoyment of learning. Some will accrue
more broadly in society, like the likelihood that an educated child will
become a more productive adult. In deciding how much to invest in
educational programming (in terms of the costs of the programming
and the aggravation of getting their child to consume it), the child’s
parent will internalize the private benefits, but not all of the public
benefits. As a result, there will be fewer children in the audience,
resulting in reduced compensation for the content producers, than
would be optimal.
It is generally accepted that information of many kinds can
produce positive externalities, such as by contributing to civic
discourse or by checking official power, to a degree that is not
reflected in the market for information.101 The prevalence of positive
externalities in media markets is related to the hybrid nature of media
outputs and actors. A video experience is a consumer product that
may also become a basis for political decision or social behavior. A
cable operator or broadcaster is simultaneously a commercial
operation and a political institution.102 If these positive externalities
100

See generally, Policies and rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming
and Revision of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, 11
F.C.C.R. 10660, 10664 (1996) (reviewing positive effects of educational
programming on social skills and school preparedness).
101
By the same token, media products can fail to produce these desired effects or
even reduce social welfare to a degree that is not internalized in the consumption of
programming. These harmful effects, the costs of which are external to the
economic decisionmaking of media enterprises and individual consumers, are
negative externalities. See, e.g., GEORGE COMSTOCK & ERICA SCHARRER,
TELEVISION: WHAT’S ON, WHO’S WATCHING AND WHAT IT MEANS 274-298 (1999)
(reviewing studies on the causal relationship between viewing of television violence
and violent or other anti-social behavior); JAMES T. HAMILTON, CHANNELING
VIOLENCE 20-30 (1998) (same). But cf. MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE
CHILDREN: “INDECENCY,” CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 243-253
(2001) (criticizing the media effects literature); Interactive Digital Software Ass’n
v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 958-59 (8th Cir. 2003) (questioning linkage
between exposure to violent video games and harm to minors).
102
See, e.g., Garnham, supra note xx at 47 (the incompatibility between the
commercial and political functions of the media turns on “the value system and set
of social relations within which commercial media must operate and which they
serve to reinforce….[P]olitical communication [on a commercial platform] …
becomes the politics of consumerism. Politicians relate to potential voters not as
rational beings concerned for the public good, but in the mode of advertising, as
creatures of passing and largely irrational appetite, to whose self-interest they must
appeal.”).
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are not internalized into the production of media products, the
collective consequences of consumer choices will “turn out to be very
different from what … [the consumer] anticipate[s].”103
What complicates the positive externalities defense of market
supplementation is that the external benefits of media products, unlike
typical externalities, may not be concentrated in third-party effects.104
Instead, these benefits may accrue to the individual consumer who is
making the media choice as well as to society at large. The viewer
exposed to an incisive report on local politics, for example, may
herself benefit, as may others influenced by her. And yet, she will
eschew the programming if she does not value the private benefits it
would confer. Particularly where this is the case, the idea that
government should foster the delivery of such programmingruns head
long into charges of paternalism, making such policies suspect
especially for those whose democratic and economic theories are
premised on individual autonomy.
Advocates of market supplementation may avoid the taint of
paternalism even with respect to the generation of these effects by
refuting the notion that individual demand is exogenous to the
market.105 Work in behavioral economics, drawing on cultural studies
and psychological theories, emphasizes the contingency of personal
preference.106 In the media context, commercial media enterprises,

103

Sunstein, supra note xx [Television] at 517.
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40-42 (3d ed.
2000) (defining externalities as third-party effects).
105
See BAKER, supra note xx [Media, Markets] at 97-98, 121 (suggesting that it
would be paternalistic to deprive consumers of the choices that media policy
promotes); SUNSTEIN, supra note xx [Democracy] at 115 (“the deprivation of
opportunities is a deprivation of freedom – even if people have adapted to it and do
not want anything more.”). For an attempt to square paternalism with liberal ideals,
see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162-66 (2003) (defending attempts by public
and private institutions to influence behavior even when the objective is purely to
improve the individual’s own behavior and not to change third party effects so long
as such attempts are non-coercive).
106
See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1700, 1758 (2003) (characterizing the consumer, from the perspective of cultural
studies theory, as “neither purely sovereign nor purely susceptible, but rather
permanently engaged in a dialectical conversation with product manufacturers,
marketers, regulators, and others regarding the social significance of consuming
activities.”); Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences
of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75, 75 (1998)
(“Markets and other economic institutions do more than allocate goods and
services: they also influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities.”);
104
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through marketing and the exploitation of informational cascades, are
able to develop tastes in the kinds of fare that they intend to
produce.107 So developed, consumer desires naturally agitate for
more of the same. Understanding this, it becomes possible to square
market supplementation with liberalism, going beyond positive
externalities to embrace a conception of personal choice as a product
of media offerings themselves and thus endogenous to market
dynamics.108 As one commentator has put it, a purely market-based
approach to video products creates “a danger that consumers will
under-invest in their own tastes, experience and capacity to
comprehend because it is only in retrospect that the benefits of such
investment become apparent.”109
The debate over consumer preference formation and its
relationship to media policy is not just a matter of academic theory,
but has become a point of contention in policy discussions. At an
FCC field hearing held prior to its sweeping relaxation of broadcast
ownership limits, FCC Chairman Michael Powell challenged the
Chairman of the Parents Television Council, who had described
television offerings as “raw sewage.”110 Powell observed that, “[w]e
can call it sludge, but it’s the sludge people are watching.”111 The
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129, 1145-66 (1986) (reviewing literature on consumer preferences).
107
See COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note xx at 68 (claiming that
the media train the public to accept and even embrace sub-optimal content by
“building and transforming the interests of the public.”). See also, Guy Pessach,
Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing Materials: Unveiling
the Scope of Copyright’s Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1074
(2003) (arguing that broad copyright protection leverages the ability of “corporate
media” to “dominate the market and shape the audience’s tastes and preferences
according to their common types and genres of creative materials, as well as their
specific media products.”).
108
See BAKER, supra note xx [Media, Markets] at 87-95; SUNSTEIN, supra note xx
[Democracy] at 73-74.
109
DOYLE, supra note xx at 66 (quoting G. Davies). The notion that consumer
preferences are as much the result as the source of media products is rooted in the
critical media studies of the middle and late twentieth century. The argument of the
post-War critical theorists, led by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, is that
mass commercial culture perpetuates the values of, and supports the winners in, a
capitalist system by removing from the consciousness of consumers any alternative
to capitalism. See, e.g., NICK STEVENSON, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA CULTURES:
SOCIAL THEORY AND MASS COMMUNICATION 53-54 (1995) (analyzing the
relationship among various Frankfurt School theorists).
110
Broadcast Ownership En Banc, Richmond Virginia, 2003 FCC LEXIS 2010 * 47
(April 15, 2003) (statement of Brent Bozell criticizing “ultra violence, … graphic
sex, … [and] raunchy language” in media).
111
Id. at *83 (Statement of Chairman Powell).
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consumer advocate responded that “when you’ve got a handful of
corporations controlling … [programming], then what they determine
is going to go on television is what can by itself determine what the
market wants…when the public is getting a certain message, a certain
kind of program, a certain value system, … ultimately, there is going
to be a significant part of that market that is going to accept that
message and want more of it”.112
Given the existence of broad market failures, an aspirational
media policy must do more than correct a poorly functioning market.
It must provide diversions around existing media markets and taste
constellations. It can do this by changing consumer wants and then
reintroducing a richer consumer palette to the market. So
reintroduced, the consumer might then force the market to provide
media products with greater positive externalities, including common
exposure to difference and public elevation.
III.Media Policy, Markets, and New Technologies
We have seen that a competitive marketplace of mediated
expression, if it is to serve democratic purposes, must at once serve
and influence the sovereign consumer. Digital technology creates
new dynamics in media production and consumption that ought to
change the way media policy approaches both reactive and proactive
goals. The following subsections unpack the relationship between
media policy and the market, showing how new media innovations at
once challenge and support policy interventions in the media
marketplace. Subsection A identifies the major changes that digital
technologies effect in the production and consumption of video
media. Subsection B then shows how these changes reduce, but do
not eradicate, narrow market failures. Broad market failures,
subsection C argues, are aggravated in a digitally networked
environment.
A. New Media Dynamics
Digital media involve the following phenomena often, but not
always, in concert: the digital encoding of media content by
producers, the distribution of such content through digital networks,
and the storage and playback of such content on digital devices. The
spread of these phenomena has two major consequences for media
policy. The first is simply the increased amount of content that
becomes available through broadcast, cable, satellite, and broadband
networks as a result of increased carrying capacity. The second is the
112

Id. at *84 (Statement of Brent Bozell). See also id. at *91-92 (Statement of
Andrew Schwartzman) (media conglomerates use cross-marketing and vertical
power to develop appetites for products).
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increased degree of consumer control over the consumption and even
the production of video content.
Digital media increase the amount of content available to
consumers in a number of interrelated ways.
First, digital
compression technologies allow traditional subscription television
services like cable and satellite to offer hundreds of content channels
at various price points.113 Second, interactive technologies then allow
these distributors to fully exploit increased channel capacity by
providing programming to consumers on an on-demand basis. The
interactive components of digital television distribution systems
enable consumers to draw on video libraries on a per-program basis,
disaggregating networks from bundled service tiers,114 and programs
from networks.115 Third, digital broadband networks create new
distribution channels for traditional video content like movies and
television programs, as well as other forms of video entertainment
like games and video chatting.116 These digital channels may be used

113

Broadcast stations that could transmit only one channel of programming by
analog means can now transmit five by digital means. See Ellen P. Goodman,
Digital Television and the Allure of Auctions: The Birth and Stillbirth of DTV
Legislation, 49 Fed. Com. L. J. 517, 523 (1997) (describing the capabilities of
digital broadcast technology). Cable systems that were once limited to 35 channels
have now joined satellite services in offering several hundred, see Video
Competition Report, supra note xx at 1624, although the average cable subscriber
only receives 62 channels. See Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Statistical Report on Average
Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and Equipment, 18 FCC Rcd
13284 (2003). Although this paper does not address the distributional effects of
changes in video distribution technologies, they are manifold. The channel
explosion is concentrated in pay television services like cable, DVDs or
subscription-based broadband services, as opposed to free-to-the viewer broadcast
services.
114
A “service tier” is a cable service for which the operator charges a separate rate.
47 U.S.C. § 522 (17) (2003).
115
Today, most of the major cable operators are deploying video on demand
services. It has been estimated that about seven million homes had access to video
on demand at the end of 2002. Unlike pay-per-view services, which provide a
relatively limited menu of programming on the operator’s schedule, video on
demand allows consumers to order a wide array of programming from a central
server at any time of the day and to pause the programming. Because technologies
like video on demand use distribution capacity on an opportunistic basis, rather than
“occupying” real estate on the distribution pipe, the distributor can carry many more
programs on an on-demand basis than it could accommodate ordinary program
networks. Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1638-39.
116
See, e.g., Sarah McBride, Studios to Set Deals in Bid to Get PCs to Show Movies,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 14, 2004, at D4 (reporting on new partnerships
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themselves to stream content or may be used to facilitate the
distribution of DVDs directly to the consumer.117
As content options increase, the ability of the audience to
navigate media offerings becomes more critical. Digital technologies
respond to this need by providing tools for audience control over the
selection and timing of media experiences. It is this control, in
tandem with the spread of viewer attention over more video options,
which makes attention an increasingly scarce resource. By using
digital electronic program guides and search engines, the viewer can
filter out content of little interest and program her digital delivery
systems to provide more of what she wants.118 These search
techniques, in combination with personal video recorders or other
digital storage devices, enable the viewer to create her own viewing
schedule and skip freestanding commercials.119
Another kind of audience control facilitated by digital
technologies is consumer contribution to the production of video
content. Most minimally, real time interactive features of television
programming can funnel viewer reactions into programming that is
professionally produced. More substantially, digital production
techniques and Internet distribution make it possible for amateur
involvement in the production and distribution of video content either
individually or as part of collaborative peer networks.120 These

between content companies and hardware and software companies to facilitate
delivery of video programming over PCs).
117
Video “rental” enterprises like Netflix and direct sales from producers exemplify
how the cheap production and shipment of DVDs can create new markets for video
content. See, e.g., Peter Wayner, In the Era of Cheap DVD’s, Anyone Can Be a
Producer, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at G1 (reporting on distribution of
independent films and other video productions in DVD format through the mail).
118
See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
119
See Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1715 (“A [personal video
recorder] is a device connected to a television set, either embedded in a set-top box
or as a stand-alone device, which uses a hard disk drive, software, and other
technology to digitally process and record programming.”). Approximately 3.7
million homes had PVRs at the end of 2003. Id. This number will rise
precipitously as cable and satellite operators roll out PVRs in their digital set-top
boxes. See Stuart Elliott & Ken Belson, Stop Me if You’ve Seen This One Before,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at C1.
120
See infra notes xx and accompanying text. See also F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan
Hunter, The Laws of Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14-21 (2004) (illustrating
how digital video game participants create virtual worlds online).
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contributions can take the form of original productions or of
modifications to professionally produced content.121
Taking media abundance and audience control to be the most
significant innovations of digital media, the question is how these
innovations impact government intervention in media markets in
furtherance of media policy goals. The subsections below approach
this question with respect to both narrow and broad market failures.
B. Narrow Market Failures and Market Corrections
Many have a complaint about television – what it does not
offer, what it offers too much of. Yet it is difficult to determine with
confidence whether video markets really fail to deliver on consumer
preferences, suggesting market failures, or whether demand for
certain products is simply insufficient, suggesting market lacunae.
Arguments that media markets fail the public are vulnerable to the
claim that most markets fail to deliver what some segment of the
market might desire.
One cannot necessarily find the exact
automobile configuration one wants either. The difference is that
“[t]ruth and understanding are not wares like peanuts and potatoes,”
as Justice Frankfurter put it.122 It is because media products have an
unusually potent social and political valence, making the
abandonment of even small audience communities particularly
important from a policy perspective, that media markets deserve
special consideration. Given the stakes, intervention may be
warranted in the market for information where it would not be in the
markets for legumes and root vegetables.
Even if the failure of video markets to give many people what
they want were not worth more consideration than equally plausible
claims about other markets, media markets have challenged consumer
sovereignty to an atypical degree.123 At least under conditions of
121
See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 397, 418-19 (2003) (providing examples of consumer contributions to video
content).
122
Associated Press v. United States 326 U.S. 1, 17 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
123
There is a substantial literature on the relationship between media market
structure and economic welfare. Using game theory and theories of monopolistic
competition, this literature has focused largely on the normative question of how
much media concentration should be allowed. See Peter O. Steiner, Program
Patterns and Preference, and the Workability of Competition in Radio
Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. ECON. 194 (1952) (concentrated media outlet ownership can
result in greater diversity of program genre given stringently limited channel
capacity); Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices in Television
Markets, 91 Q.J. ECON. 15 (1977) (the ideal degree of competition in media markets
depends on viewer tolerance of second-choice programming and channel capacity);
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channel scarcity, three market features tend to reduce market
responsiveness to smaller audience groups below optimal levels. First
is the absence of strong price signaling by consumers in video
markets that remain heavily reliant on advertising revenue. Second,
further diluting the force of smaller audience preferences, are the
unusually risky gambles entailed by expensive and mostly
unsuccessful video programming. These gambles create pressures on
program producers, aggregators and distributors to favor proven
program formulae and talent, and to spread the costs and risks of
media products over large audiences. These same pressures lead to
the third feature: the concentration of media enterprises in large,
integrated corporations with interests that may not be in perfect
alignment with consumer choice.
This subsection takes each of these features in turn, predicting
the ability of digital innovations to cure narrow market failures by
improving responsiveness to consumer demand.
1. Audience Voice
The translation of audience desires into television
programming, whether it is distributed by means of broadcast, cable,
or broadband, is distorted by the way in which programming is sold.
Specifically, the historic domination of advertiser interests combined
with the lack of precision in the expression of audience preferences
serve to mute the audience voice. Technologies that foster audience
control and content abundance threaten the dominance of traditional
advertising in video media markets, changing the role of advertisers in
mediating the audience voice. These changes cut both in favor and
against consumer sovereignty.
a) Analog Mediascape
That advertising so dominates today’s video marketplace is
the result of market responses to the public good characteristics of
video programming.124 Like other information products, video

Spence & Owen, supra note xx (a market with a higher degree of price
discrimination (i.e., pay television) and competition is more likely to produce
diversity in programming). See generally OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 6492, 141-42 (summarizing the literature on program distribution and market
structure).
124
See John R. Woodbury, Welfare Analysis and the Video Marketplace in VIDEO
COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 274 (Eli M. Noam
ed., 1985) (distinguishing media products from sweaters and cars because of
programming’s “heavy dose of public-good characteristics.”); C. Edwin Baker,
Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 311, 316 (1997)
(distinguishing media products from “typical” products like cars and can openers);
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programming is non-rivalrous, meaning that a video product
consumed by some is still equally available to others. Moreover, a
video product is to varying degrees, non-excludable, meaning that the
owners of a video product can only imperfectly control its
dissemination to the public.125 Because of these public good features,
advertising was the sole means of support for television programming
before the advent of cable. Although consumer payments in the form
of cable and satellite subscription fees now contribute substantially to
video production and distribution, advertising remains the
preponderant source of revenue across distribution platforms.126
Advertisers then are the real consumers of video programming
in the case of broadcast and other freely available content and are at
least co-equal with viewers in the case of subscription television.127
The advertiser’s desire for a large audience means that advertiser and
Sunstein, supra note xx at 514 [Television] (noting that television programming “is
not an ordinary product…”).
125
Some have suggested that the ability of subscription services to exclude nonpayers eliminates the non-excludability aspect of television. See, e.g., Yoo, supra
note xx at 1584. However, with the exception of pay-per-view or on demand
programming, viewers are excluded from programming only on a network-bynetwork basis and, far more commonly, only on a tier-by-tier basis. With respect to
any particular program and any given network, the excludability tools of producers
remain very crude. Powers of excludability would be increase should the cable and
satellite industries shift from tiered services to what are known as á la carte services,
allowing consumers to purchase only those networks that they wanted. Such a
conversion would impose its own costs on consumer satisfaction. See infra note xx.
126
This is true, of course, in the case of broadcast television services, which are free
to the viewer, but it is also true of subscription cable or satellite television services,
which rely heavily on advertising revenue as well. Total cable network advertising
revenue for 2002 was reported to be $10.828 billion out of the total revenue for the
same networks of $20.146 billion.
Thus, advertising revenue constituted
approximately 54% of the cable networks' revenue in 2002. Kagan, BROADBAND
ADVERTISING No. 331 at 2-3 (March 31, 2003) (cable network advertising revenue);
Kagan, CABLE PROGRAM INVESTOR No. 65 at 3-4 (April 16, 2003) (total cable
network revenue). Cable operators take in significantly less advertising revenue
than do cable networks. When combined, the cable industry relies on advertising
for about 30% of its revenue. HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
ECONOMICS 274 (6th ed. 2004).
127
See THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF
COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 276 (1996) (“One of the
central incongruities of American broadcasting is that the audience is construed
simultaneously as both subject and object of the system, both the buyer and the
thing sold.”); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.
J. 311, 319 (1997) (“The media enterprise commonly sells media products to
audiences and sells audiences to advertisers.”); Sunstein, supra note xx [Television]
at 514 (“. . . it is more accurate to say that viewers are a commodity, or a product,
that broadcasters deliver to the people who actually pay them: advertisers.”).
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consumer interests will substantially overlap. However, advertisers
are not perfect surrogates for consumers and the interjection of
advertiser interests can distort the conversion of consumer preferences
into media products.128
There are several reasons for the misalignment between
advertiser purchases and consumer preferences. To begin with,
advertisers have an inexact understanding of audience desires.129
More profoundly, advertisers and consumers are buying different
products. Consumers, of course, are buying programming.
Advertisers are purchasing viewer attention (especially the attention
of younger viewers) adjusted for the likelihood that the viewer will
actually buy the goods and services being advertised, not the program
being supplied. As a result, advertisers place a higher value on those
demographic groups associated with the ability and inclination to
spend on consumer goods.130 Advertisers may be willing to sacrifice
128

Economic models of television programming have long noted the biases
introduced into programming selection by advertiser support. See generally OWEN
& WILDMAN, supra note xx at 91-92. For a governmental perspective, see Jonathan
Levy et al., FCC OPP Working Paper No. 37: Broadcast Television: Survivor in a
Sea
of
Competition,
at
7
(2002),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A22.doc (observing
that because “[t]he value of the programming to viewers will differ from the value
of the audience to the advertisers,” not all audiences will get what they want).
129
The Nielsen ratings, which monopolize the measurement of television audiences,
depend on the self-reporting of a small sample of households. Even when the
sample size is large, the ratings data may be highly inaccurate due to poor reporting.
See, e.g., Bill Carter, Young Men are Back Watching TV. But Did They Ever
Leave?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at C1 (reporting on erroneous Nielsen ratings
purporting to show 10% drop in young men aged 18-34 watching television in
2003). Because the samples are more accurate the larger they are, ratings accuracy
decreases with the size of the audience, resulting in the chronic mismeasurement of
niche audiences. See PHILIP M. NAPOLI, AUDIENCE ECONOMICS 139-145, 176
(2003) (showing how ratings data becomes less accurate with audience
fragmentation); COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 20, 2004, at 9 (citing report
showing that Nielsen Media Research ratings may underestimate Latino viewing of
particular programs by 30%). So poor are ratings data for smaller audiences that
Nielsen will not even rate programming on cable networks that are not available in
at least 20 million households. Michael G. Baumann & Kent W. Mikkelsen,
Economists Incorporated, Benefits of Bundling and Costs of Unbundling Cable
Networks in Comments of the Walt Disney Company in A La Carte and Themed
Programming and Pricing Options for Programming Distribution on Cable
Television and Direct Broadcast Satellite Systems, MB Docket No. 04-207, at 9
(F.C.C. filed July 15, 2004).
130
The most desirable such group consists of 18-34 year olds, followed by 19-49
year olds. Wayne Friedman, Cable Jumps Upfront Gun, TELEVISION WEEK, May
17, 2004, at 1.
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a larger audience for a more desirable demographic, resulting in a
preference for programming skewed to attract these cohorts.131
The disconnect between advertiser and consumer interests
extends beyond advertising sales. Consistent with their desire to sell
goods or services, advertisers favor relatively sanguine programming
that enhances the “buying mood” of the public.132 They can exercise
this preference not only after production, through advertising
purchases, but before the fact in intimate consultation with the
networks developing program schedules.133
Perhaps the greatest source of divergence between consumer
desires and advertiser support is the crude communication of audience
demand. Apart from their inaccuracies, ratings measure interest in a
binary fashion -- thumbs up or thumbs down. Because ratings do not
capture the intensity of viewer preferences, an advertiser’s valuation
of a consumer may have very little correlation with the consumer’s
valuation of a program.134 The inability of viewers to signal the
intensity of their desires often results in commercial television
programming that reflects the middling interest of the many instead of
the strong interest of the fewer.135 So, for example, a program that
receives six points out of ten from ten viewers in a focus group might
131

See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 2097, 2165 (1992) (“Advertisers ‘pay’ the media to obtain the audience they
desire, providing a strong incentive for the media to shape content to appeal to this
‘desired’ audience.”); Sunstein, supra note xx at 514-15 (“Advertisers like certain
demographic groups and dislike others, even when the numbers are equal; they pay
extra amounts in order to attract groups that are likely to purchase the relevant
products, and this affects programming content.”); Yoo, supra note xx at 1635.
132
See, e.g., Baker, [advertising] supra note xx at 2153-64 (discussing advertisers’
interests in programming that creates a “buying mood” and avoids controversy);
Sunstein, supra note xx [Television] at 515 (“[A]dvertisers want programming that
will put viewers in a receptive purchasing mood, and hence not be too ‘depressing’ .
. . and also tend to dislike programming that is highly controversial . . .”); Inger L.
Stole, Advertising in CULTURE WORKS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CULTURE 100
(Richard Maxwell ed., 2001) (advertisers “want the overall media content to
complement their commercial messages…”).
133
Early in the production schedule, advertisers preview programs under
consideration for placement in the network schedule. According to a study prepared
for the FCC, “[f]or all shows, programmers consider the demographics of the
audience the show is likely to attract”. Mara Einstein, Program Diversity and the
Program Selection Process on Broadcast Network Television, FCC Media
Ownership Working Group Study No. 5, at 7-8 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A10.pdf (arguing
that media consolidation has not diminished media diversity).
134
See Yoo, supra note xx at 1630-31 (noting that reliance on advertising support
undermines any price signaling of intensity).
135
Einstein, supra note xx at 33 (quoting producer Rob Burnett).
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be favored over one that received three tens and seven zeros,
depending on the demographic characteristics of the individuals.136 It
is also plausible that a program receiving a three from ten viewers
would be preferred to one receiving a ten from three viewers. This
makes video programming very different from consumer goods
whose prices fluctuate depending on the intensity of demand for
them.137
Cable and satellite operators increase price discrimination
through differential subscriber fees for different program packages.
However, because most cable programming is bundled into tiers of a
dozen or more channels, consumers are unable to signal the intensity
of their preferences for a particular network carried on the tier, or for
programs aggregated by that network.138 Moreover, cable audiences
are sold to advertisers by program tier, not by program or network.139
As a result, the advertising rates for particular networks depend upon
the popularity of other networks with which they are grouped. Such
bundling further obscures the true audience interest in any particular
channel on the tier.
b) Digital Mediascape
Innovations in audience measurement, digital recording, and
program sales raise questions about the future of advertising and
whether advertising will continue to distort the responsiveness of
media markets to consumer choice. These distortions will likely
decrease as tailored fee-for-service video packages reduce reliance on
advertising. The result will be an increased quantity of niche
programming disadvantaged by the dominance of advertisers. At the
136

Id.
In the first example above, substitute diamonds for network programs. A
merchant might earn as much from selling three madly desired diamonds as from
selling six moderately desired diamonds. The result is that people can get the
diamonds they want depending on the amount they’re willing to pay.
138
See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 111-117 (flat fees for a bundle of video
services deprive the programmer of any way to realize the value of intensely held
preferences, leading to non-production of a program whose value to viewers, when
measured by their willingness to pay, is greater than the cost of producing it).
Premium networks, like HBO and Showtime, which are sold on an unbundled pernetwork basis are able to capture the intensity of audience interest through more
perfect price discrimination. The price, however, is higher marketing costs. See
note xx.
139
Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1706 (cable advertising revenues are
based on the number of potential viewers, i.e., the number of subscribers to the
service tier on which the network is carried); National Cable &
Telecommunications Association, supra note xx at 6 (explaining relationship
between service tiers and advertising rates).
137
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same time, we can expect advertisers to find new ways of reaching
audiences through video products. Advertiser responses to digital
abundance and consumer control may well introduce new distortions
that contribute to narrow market failures.
At the very least, digital technology might be expected to
eradicate the problems advertisers have had with audience
measurement. Interactive tools lodged within digital television or
Internet receiving devices can provide more fine-grained information
on the preferences of participating audience members.140 However,
early digital audience measurement techniques show that technology
alone cannot remedy inaccuracies that result from sampling. New
digital Nielsen “people meters,” for example, may substantially
mismeasure actual audiences due to small audience samples.141
Whether or not technology that improves audience
measurement can keep pace with audience fragmentation, the value of
the audience to advertisers, and thus the impact of advertising on
content, may decline in the digital mediascape. There are two
developments to note in this respect.
The first is audience
fragmentation across more channels of video entertainment and
information. Not all advertisers require a mass audience. 142 But the
largest funders of media products, such as Procter and Gamble and
General Motors,143 value mass audiences much more highly than
niche audiences.144 Audience fragmentation makes it more difficult to
140

See, e.g., Kevin J. Delaney and Robert A. Guth, Beep. Foosh. Buy Me. Pow:
Nielsen Plans a New Service To Assess Audiences for Ads in Hot Videogame
Medium, WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 8, 2004 at B1 (reporting new measurement
techniques to assess video gamers’ exposure to and recall of advertising placed “in
game” in console-based videogames).
141
See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, Critics of Nielsen’s Changes in its Television Ratings
Methods Take Their Battle to the Small Screen, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004 at C2
(reporting on industry protests against Nielsen’s implementation of new technology
to measure audience sizes which allegedly undercounts minority viewers).
Embedding this technology into all devices would correct for sample distortions, but
would raise a host of privacy and performance problems.
142
Some niche audiences, such as upscale golf viewers, can be of more value on a
cost per thousand basis to particular advertisers than a mass audience. See PICARD,
supra note xx at 135 (“For media with specialized audiences, advertisers are willing
to pay a higher cost per thousand than is available in mass media because the media
are able to deliver audiences with specific characteristics that the advertising may be
targeting.”)
143
BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE & DOUGLAS GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?:
COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY 219 (3d ed.
2000) (listing the top advertisers on cable).
144
See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 156 (1991)
(presenting the “Nielsen slope” as a graphic depiction of the increase in the cost per
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find such mass audiences, explaining why advertising revenue on the
most watched broadcast channels has increased even as the total
viewership on these channels has declined.145 Digital consumer
technology which enable convenient ad skipping, today most often
found in personal video recorders, also devalue audiences to
advertisers. Consumers enabled with this technology are more likely
than not to fast forward through conventional 15 or 30 second spot
advertisements, thereby reducing the advertiser’s reach even where a
mass audience has been assembled.146
The advertising industry may respond in three possible ways
to audience devaluation. It could abandon television and other
broadly distributed video media – a course so improbable, we can
disregard it. Alternatively, it could increase the frequency of
commercials to counterbalance the reduction in audience attention.
Given the commercial saturation of video programming that already
exists, populating content with even more ads would seem to be
counterproductive, particularly given the spread of ad-skipping
technologies. The most likely advertiser response to fragmentation
and viewer flight from advertising is to develop new communication
tools that penetrate the audience more effectively so as to recapture
some of the attention television once delivered. These tools will have
both salutary and harmful impacts on audience service.
Assuming that audience measurement techniques are able to
provide advertisers with more accurate information about who is
watching what, with what constancy of attention, and even what
thousand audience members to advertisers as the ratings for a program increase).
One advertisement that reaches 1 million viewers is more valuable that two that
reach 500,000 viewers each because the 1 million constitutes “unduplicated reach.”
Baumann & Mikkelsen, supra note xx at 10. The value of mass audiences to
advertisers is further increased if they can purchase exposure to such audiences on a
bundled basis within or across networks. These economies favor concentrated
distribution for media products.
145
TODREAS, supra note xx at 188 (showing how broadcast networks, in part
because of the transactional efficiencies they offer, have maintained a
disproportionate share of advertising revenue even as their share of viewers has
decreased). Broadcast television advertising increased from $26.6 billion in 1990 to
$41.8 billion in 2002; cable advertising increased from $2.6 billion to $15.8 billion
in the same period. U.S. Bureau of Census, Annual Survey of Communications
Services, at 794 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statisticalabstract-03.html.
146
See Georg Szalai, Sales Boom Replays PVR Debate, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER at
1 (Dec. 29, 2003)(personal video recorder users skip 70% of televised
advertisements). There are estimates that the personal video recorder will cost the
television industry $12 billion in advertising revenue by 2006. NAPOLI, supra note
xx [audience economics] at 151.

2004]

Media Policy Out of the Box

43

amount of pleasure, advertisers could take advantage of interactive
capabilities to better tailor promotions for particular audiences. They
could, for example, provide more detailed information to interested
viewers, supporting a stronger and more lasting impression. Better
information about the target audience might, thus, improve the
effectiveness of the advertisement and reduce the minimum audience
size necessary for programming to attract advertiser support.147 These
innovations would allow program producers, aggregators, and
distributors to be more attentive to smaller audiences that advertisers
now ignore, perhaps improving the optimal mix of programming.148
Other possibilities for advertising’s evolution may decrease
the responsiveness of programming to consumer desires. Faced with
a fractured and inattentive audience, advertisers are finding new ways
to make their messages unavoidable. For example, they are inserting
product placements into the program narrative and “wrapping”
program content with product logos.149 Taking this approach one step
further, advertisers are working with programmers to develop
programming around products, rather than simply working to place
products into programming developed independently.150 Federal
Express, for example, worked closely with the producers of the
popular film Castaway to control the portrayal of the company’s
products and services in a movie about a Federal Express airplane
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See Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and
Content, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 197 (Sept. 2003) at
12, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html. Alternatively, it could
lead to increased stratification in programming support as advertisers refined their
ability to target high-value, high-income consumers. See Comments of Consumers
Union et al. in Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspaper, MM Docket
No. 01-235, at 60 (F.C.C. filed Dec. 3, 2001).
148
It should be noted that no amount of measuring or appealing to niche audiences
solves the problem of general interest advertisers aiming at a mass audience. These
advertisers will continue to look for programming with mass appeal.
149
See, e.g., Daisy Whitney, A ‘Tivo-Proof’ Ad Model; Ripe TV Will Weave
Messages Into Its On-Demand Service, TELEVISION WEEK, Mar. 29, 2004 at 25.
150
For example, Disney’s ESPN2 presented a documentary about boxing champion
Roy Jones Jr., which was created by an advertising agency on behalf of its client,
Nike. The boxer, who is also a pitchman for Nike, wore the company’s apparel
throughout the program. The program cost twice as much as a commercial would
have ($650,000), but ran during prime time free of charge. Other examples of this
new trend whereby advertising agencies produce video featuring their clients
include Interpublic Group’s co-production of the reality program The Restaurant,
which aired on NBC and featured clients such as Coors and Mitsubishi. See
Suzanne Vranica, Hollywood Goes Madison Avenue, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec.
15, 2003, at B5.
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crash survivor.151 While this trend is probably neutral with respect to
the audience size necessary to support a program, it intensifies
advertisers’ interest in the kind of programming with which they are
associated. When spots are discrete breaks in a program, the tenor of
the program is at some remove from the product. This distance closes
markedly when the product is in the hand of an actor or, indeed, when
the actor is in the hands of the advertiser. Thus, a shift from spot
advertising to in-program advertising could well increase advertiser
influence over content, opening the gap between viewer preferences
and programmers’ responsiveness.152
Recall that, in addition to advertiser interests, the inability of
audience members to register preference intensities has disadvantaged
minority tastes.153
By increasing transmission capacity and
interactivity, digital technology enables distributors to sell
programming directly to consumers through such services as video on
demand, broadband streaming, or even simply mail-order DVDs.154
To the extent that consumers are willing to pay for programming
delivered in this way, programmers of at least some kinds of video
products will rely less on advertising, reducing advertisers’ impact on
programming whatever strategies they may develop to address
audience fragmentation and control. More importantly, greater price
discrimination in the sale of video programming could increase the
availability of programming that is in high demand by relatively small
audience segments.155 These developments, discussed below, will
151

See NAPOLI, supra note xx [Audience Economics] at 153.
There is a long policy tradition of requiring broadcasters to make it clear to the
public who has paid for programming. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508 (2003); 47
C.F.R. § 73.1212(a) (2003) (requiring identification of sponsor of any material “for
which money, service or other valuable consideration is either directly or indirectly
paid or promised to, or charged or accepted by such station…”). The FCC has found
that the use of subliminal advertising, defined as an attempt “to convey information
to the viewer by transmitting messages below the threshold level of normal
awareness,” is “contrary to the public interest” because such advertisements are
“intended to be deceptive.” Public Notice Concerning the Broadcast of Information
by Means of “Subliminal Perception” Techniques, 44 FCC 2d 1016, 1017 (1974).
153
See supra notes xx and accompanying text.
154
As of July 2003, an average of 12% of all Americans had watched some form of
Internet video in the past month, up from an average 8% as of July 2002. There is
a significant amount of streaming video available for viewing in real-time as well as
other video, like movies made available through Movielink, a joint venture of five
major movie studios, available for storage and playback. Notably, however, most of
this video is not original and is otherwise available through other media organs.
Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1674-75.
155
OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 83 (discussing price discrimination as a
way out of the public good problem of television programming).
152
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likely amplify the audience voice and result in more programming for
niche audiences, although the impact on choice will be complex and
variable across programming types.
2. Programming Gambles
The economics of video production are as responsible as
advertisers for the underproduction of certain kinds of programming.
Upfront investments in professional video production tend to be
relatively high, while the likelihood that any particular product will
achieve market success is relatively low. This combination creates a
programming sweet spot favoring the safe over the risky, imitation
over experimentation, and experienced insiders over newcomers.156
At least where distribution channels are scarce, as the first subpart
below shows, it is a spot contoured for the satisfaction of expressed
majority tastes over expressed minority, or unexpressed, tastes. The
second subpart examines the degree to which these patterns will
persist in a digitally networked environment.
a) Analog Mediascape
What economist Harold Hotelling in 1929 labeled the
“excessive sameness” of media products is rooted in basic
characteristics of video supply and demand.157 Expensive production
and volatile consumption patterns, combined with low variable
distribution costs and imperfect price discrimination, motivate media
producers to aggregate large audiences for any given video product.
On the supply side, video products are characterized by high
first copy costs.158 The yearly operating expense of a cable network is
156

See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY:
COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 29-48 (2000) (discussing incentives
to produce homogenous content); BAKER, supra note xx [media markets] at 37-40
(relating tendency towards homogenization of media products to public-goods
characteristics); OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 99-100 (showing how
satisfaction of majority tastes tends to be excessive because it is more profitable to
carve up large audiences than to risk smaller ones); Einstein, supra note xx at 45-49
(citing advertiser pressures and efforts to repackage successful formulas as factors
leading to bland, homogeneous programming.); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and
Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 92-98
(2001) (arguing that mass media markets shortchange diverse content); See
Sunstein, supra note xx [television] at 515-17 (discussing incentives for
homogeneity in programming).
157
Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, ECONOMIC JOURNAL 34, 41-57
(1929), cited in W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 129
(1991).
158
Some video, like reality and local news programming, is relatively cheap to
produce, while dramatic series, professional documentaries, global news, and
professional sports are relatively expensive. See DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM
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more than $125 million, of which 65% consists of programming
costs.159 Much recent scholarship has focused on the mutability of
these first copy costs, suggesting that they are heavily influenced by
policy choices. Extended copyright terms, for example, drive up
video costs by reducing the availability of public domain works for
inclusion in media products and distribution over media networks.160
The cult of celebrity, supported by rights of publicity, increases the
cost of talent.161 Even the legal rights enjoyed by the major
professional sports leagues, affording them control over competition
to and exhibition of their games, contribute to the expense of video
products.162
While it is true that policy choices can impact the cost of
content production, the expense of producing professional video
products is largely independent of policy discretion. Good and wideranging journalistic capabilities, as well as scripted programs with
HOYNES, THE BUSINESS OF MEDIA: CORPORATE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
157 (2001).
159
KAGAN WORLD MEDIA, ECONOMICS OF BASIC CABLE NETWORKS 25 (2003),
cited in Comments of The Progress and Freedom Foundation in A La Carte and
Themed Programming and Pricing Options for Programming Distribution on Cable
Television and Direct Broadcast Satellite Systems, MB Docket No. 04-207, at 6
(F.C.C. filed July 15, 2004). Independent start-up cable network have average costs
of $10-30 million annually. Id. For the cable operator, as opposed to the network,
programming costs account for about one third of operating expenses. U.S. Bureau
of Census, supra note xx at 730. And these costs are rising. The General
Accounting Office recently found that programming costs have risen on average by
as much as 34% in the last three years, with sports programming costs increasing on
average by 59%. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Issues Related to
Competition and Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry, GAO-04-8, 4,
21-22 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04262t.pdf
[hereinafter 2003 GAO Report].
160
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2001) (arguing that strong copyright protection
raises costs for new entrants in the content business and advantages media
enterprises with large copyright portfolios); Benkler, supra note xx [Free as Air] at
401-08 (same); RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996) (arguing that copyright ownership
enables media companies to exploit economies of scale and scope through phased
release and product expansion).
161
In the late 1990’s, the average film cost approached $60 million, plus an
additional $20 million for marketing. Substantially contributing to these costs were
the salaries of movie stars like Gwyneth Paltrow and Tom Cruise who could
command $20 million a film. COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note xx at 361.
162
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of
Professional Sports, 79 B.U.L. REV. 889, 895-905, 917-921 (1999) (detailing how
permissive antitrust regulation of sports leagues has increased media costs for sports
exhibition).
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high production values, for example, entail invariably high labor
costs.163 Video product prices depend too on promotion and branddevelopment costs, which constitute a large part of programming
budgets.164 Promotion for media brands and programming is
particularly important because media products are experience goods
whose value cannot be determined prior to purchase.165 Consumers
must therefore rely on brand reputation and third party reviews to an
unusually high degree.166 While word of mouth, weblogs, and other
forms of distributed promotion can help to reduce promotion costs
after a video product is first released, extensive marketing may be
necessary to bring consumers to the product in advance of its release,
particularly for video products with short shelf lives.
The second notable characteristic of video economics on the
supply side is that distribution costs do not vary appreciably with
audience size. It costs scarcely more to distribute a video product by
means of broadcast, cable or broadband networks to one hundred
million than to one million people. Because of these low variable
costs, at least in markets with poor price discrimination, “video
program packagers will always prefer to transmit to larger
audiences.”167 By appealing to larger audiences, media producers and
163

Such products, like other labor-intensive creative products, are excluded from the
most significant technology-related efficiency gains that accrue to the production of
other goods because of what has been called “Baumol’s disease” after the economist
William J. Baumol. Baumol showed that, because labor costs tend to rise more
quickly than other costs, the costs of cultural production tend to increase faster than
the costs of other products. DOYLE, supra note xx at 80. Video production has a
weaker case of Baumol’s disease than live artistic endeavors if audience numbers
increase. See William J. Baumol & Hilda Baumol, On Finances of the Performing
Arts During Stagflation: Some Recent Data, 169, 191 (1980) in BAUMOL’S COST
DISEASE: THE ARTS AND OTHER VICTIMS (Ruth Towse ed., 1997) (noting that the
cost per person served by mass media may remain relatively stable if the audience
per broadcast or movie rises at a rate faster than the cost of performance increases).
164
See, e.g., PICARD, supra note xx 67 (estimating that the costs of marketing as a
percentage of costs of media operations range from 20% for television to 70% for
motion pictures); MCCHESNEY, supra note xx [Rich Media] at 24-25 (discussing
importance of branding to the sale of video products).
165
The term “experience goods” was coined by Phillip Nelson, Information and
Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970). See also JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 106-44 (1998).
166
Cf. Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical
Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. REV. 817, 825 (1992) (describing the
different information requirements for experience goods as contrasted with search
goods).
167
Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R.
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aggregators can expect larger licensing, subscription, and advertising
revenue, without appreciably larger costs.168 The pursuit of these
mass audiences, of course, tends to advantage what are perceived to
be widely shared tastes.
If video product were merely expensive to produce, but fairly
certain to sell, the impact on market outputs might not be so profound.
Demand side characteristics are important too. The most significant
of these is that video products are not substitutable whenever
consumer preferences are strong. Such preferences are often strong,
either for predictable reasons (e.g., a preference for sports or
tendentious political commentary) or for unpredictable reasons (e.g., a
preference for one new actor over another). The unpredictability of
preferences makes video production highly risky as well as costly.
Only one out of every ten feature films, for example, makes a
profit.169 Only 5% of television program pilots result in a profitable
program series.170 The unpredictability of programming success,
combined with high production and low distribution costs, further
strengthens the quest for blockbuster hits.171
17312, 17323 (2001) (discussing cable programming). See also Amendment of
Section 73.368(g) of the Commission’s Rules – The Dual Network Rules, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 15 F.C.C.R. 11253, 11257-61 (2000) (discussing broadcast
programming); Douglas Gomery, Who Owns the Media? in MEDIA ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 64 (A. Alexander et al. ed., 1993) (“the optimal market for
selling a television programme, a feature film, music…or a printed publication is
the entire planet.”).
168
See ROBERT G. PICARD, THE ECONOMICS AND FINANCING OF MEDIA COMPANIES
134-5 (2002) (discussing incentives to attract the largest possible preference
groups); OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx, at 23-25 (same).
169
DOYLE, supra note xx at 108. Mining for hit movies is much like exploring for
oil. And like the oil business, the media industry tends to privilege companies that
involve themselves in the whole cycle of production and distribution from
development (exploration) to production and distribution (refining and retail).
170
Cynthia Meyers, Media Consolidation and Product Diversity: A
Recontextualization, delivered to Conference on Media Diversity and Localism:
Meaning, Metrics, and the Public Interest, Fordham University (December 2003)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author). The practice in U.S. media
markets of deficit financing exacerbates these risks of failure. Cable and broadcast
networks typically underfund the production of programming, requiring producers
to share in the financial risk. If they cannot find other financing, producers then
have to bear this risk, sharpening the bite of programming failure. DOYLE, supra
note xx at 82-3.
171
It is fairly well documented that this strategy results in the loss of “consumer
surplus” because the competitive success of some products will cause the failure of
other products that would produce more value to consumers than they cost to
produce. Thus, hits that spin off ancillary musical or durable goods produce gross
consumer welfare, but may damage net consumer welfare by eliminating more

2004]

Media Policy Out of the Box

49

This pursuit of the widely popular creates biases in favor of
programming that mimics existing programming successes and/or that
holds out the promise of a long and extended life in various media and
ancillary markets. In either case, the programming produced may
systematically shortchange minority tastes. The first proposition –
that producers and aggregators will pursue programming that
duplicates existing media options – conflicts with expectations of
market differentiation. Economists have explained this conflict,
showing how poaching a fraction of an existing audience may be
preferable to developing a new audience where media outlets are
scarce.172 Even where scarcity is reduced, the unpredictability of
public appeal and the investments required to produce high-cost
programming tends to support a culture of conformity.173 The
frequency of program failures, and the pressures of cost recovery on
programs that succeed, lead naturally to a reliance on heuristics of
success. These will include proven program formats, formulae, and
stars.
It might be supposed that a producer that foregoes large
audiences for initial release, hoping instead for market longevity,
market breadth outside of the U.S., or market synergies in non-video
product markets would be more innovative.174 But the creation of

diverse alternatives – alternatives that will be valued more highly by some segment
of the viewership than either the hit or what is left in its wake. BAKER, supra note
xx at 20-24; DOYLE, supra note xx at 77.
172
See BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA
STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 18-20 (1975) (explaining why, in the
absence of perfect price discrimination, the market will under-produce welfareenhancing programs, particularly those that are intensely desired by smaller
populations); Michael Spence & Bruce Owen, Television Programming,
Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare, 91 Q. J. ECON. 103, 103-6, 122-25 (1977)
(same). See also BAKER, supra note xx at 24 (“[T]he competitively successful but
economically unjustified material will have relatively uniform but broad appeal – a
comparatively flat demand curve. In contrast, the economically justified, audiencesatisfying material that a free market fails to produce often is material with
relatively strong, unique appeal-creating a more steeply declining demand curve.”).
173
A cultural explanation for conformity is that audience tastes are in fact largely
the same. See NEUMAN, supra note xx at 146 (“On the whole most people within a
given cultural setting display remarkably homogeneous tastes . . .. [favoring s]tories
of romance and adventure and news of war and peace…”).
174
The goal at least for high-cost productions is sale over temporal windows, for
example first in theatrical release, then on a premium cable channel, then video on
demand, then on basic cable or broadcast. For television series, the syndication or
re-run market is also critical. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 26-38; DOYLE,
supra note xx at 84 (“Windowing is a form of price discrimination in that it
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programming that can sell well in many geographic and product
markets, over an extended period of time is captive to its own
dogmas.175 For example, high action content easily translatable for
foreign audiences and content that is not particularly time-sensitive is
best suited for extended and broad exploitation.176 Moreover, content
populated by animated (or merely cartoonish) characters, music, and
highly visible consumer items make product tie-ins especially
attractive.177 The result is that audience preferences for a video
product without ancillary marketing opportunities and with limited
geographic appeal must compete against audience preferences that are
aggregated over multiple direct and ancillary markets. Programming
resources can be expected to flow in disproportionate amounts into
video products with broad and extended appeal.178
involves the same product being sold at different prices to different groups of
consumers for reasons not associated with differences in costs.”).
175
Companies with cable as well as cinematic and broadcast properties are better
able to wring value out of their investments in programming over temporal and
product windows. Thus, for example, Viacom’s Paramount film division was able
to reap a substantial profit on its Beavis and Butt-Head Do America film based on
Viacom’s MTV cartoon series. Disney is perhaps most renowned for this kind of
cross-selling, exploiting the popularity of its 1994 hit film The Lion King on
television, Broadway, and through all sorts of merchandise. MCCHESNEY, supra
note xx [Rich Media] at 22-27, 38-48 (providing examples of media conglomerate
cross-selling and intensive commercial exploitation).
176
See David Kipen, Offshoring the Audience: If France Makes Movies for the
French, and America Makes Movies for the World, Who’s Left to Make Movies for
America?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1, 2004 at [pincite] (arguing that the
prevailing view in Hollywood of domestic movie sales as loss leaders for
international box-office revenues results in a loss of films that are highly verbal and
focus on distinctly American themes like politics); C. Edwin Baker, International
Trade in Media Products in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 280-281
(Niva Elkin Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2002) (arguing that foreign sales
supply a prime motive to fill video products with violence and sex); C. Edwin
Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78 N. CAROLINA L.
REV. 1358, 1384 (2000) (same).
177
The integrated marketing strategy typical of media products that are exploited
most broadly and successfully can be seen in such films as Warner Brothers’
Batman & Robin. The studio’s promotional campaign included partnerships with
Taco Bell, Kellogg’s, Amoco, and Apple Computer as well as more than 250
licenses and tie-in with outlets like Toys ‘R’ Us, Wal-Mart and Target as well as, of
course, Warner Bros. Studio Stores around the world. JOHN RYAN & WILLIAM M.
WENTWORTH, MEDIA AND SOCIETY: THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE IN THE MASS
MEDIA 165-7 (1999).
178
Whether it is because successful windowing provides the support necessary for
big-budget investments or because big-budget investments are necessary to produce
this kind of programming, there is a clear correlation between windowing and
programming budgets. See, e.g., OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 47-49
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The relaxation of channel constraints facilitates a strategy for
coping with the high costs and high risks of video production that is
altogether different from the pursuit of mass market, multiple market
hits. Such a strategy involves production for minority tastes, with the
hopes of a more secure, albeit smaller, audience base. Cable and
satellite networks have pursued this strategy, but, on the basic service
tiers, only for relatively low cost programming. Even when supported
by the dual revenue stream of advertising and subscriptions, high-cost
programming requires a large audience in the absence of either more
perfect price discrimination or premium subscription rates. The
question for the digital era is whether new modes of price
discrimination, combined with new production and distribution
models, will substantially augment the production of programming for
taste minorities.
b) Digital Mediascape
Digital technologies have the potential to remake the
programming sweet spot by vastly increasing video distribution
channels.179 It is tempting to settle on the incontestable claim that
more distribution results in greater consumer satisfaction, without
probing what constitutes the additional flow of bits. A more rigorous
analysis asks whether digital abundance and consumer control change
the formula for commercially successful programming. The answer,
discussed below, is “maybe, in some cases.”
Technological optimists herald the end of an age in which the
mass audience is an economic necessity. Relying on the ability of
digital technologies to shift power to consumers from producers,
program aggregators, and distributors, they envision a collection of
media products that satisfy even the smallest taste constellations. In
the words of one commentator, these optimists see “a world in which
technology, consumer demand, corporate strategy, and industrial
policy are pushing companies away from standardized production for
national mass markets and toward flexible production of customized
products that better serve individual needs on a global scale.”180
(showing the correlation between motion picture budgets and the sequential release
over multiple video platforms).
179
See supra notes xx and accompanying text (identifying digital compression
technologies, interactive capabilities, and new distribution channels as the most
important contributors to video quantity).
180
Chad Raphael, The Web in CULTURE WORKS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CULTURE, supra note xx at 204. See also TRACEY, supra note xx at 264-5 (1998)
(“The rhetoric of broadband culture is that...it offers…authentic virtual communities
and relationships formed along paths of new ways of speaking to each other; access
to unbounded sources of information; new forms of political praxis; unlimited
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To test this vision, I first assume that digital technologies do
nothing but increase channel abundance. Under these circumstances,
unless consumers are willing to invest more in video consumption or
media industry profit margins fall substantially, increased abundance
will tend to drive down investment at the front end in units of video
programming.181 The predictable result is an abundance of relatively
low-budget programming.182 Decreased investment in any given
channel, as the number of channels grows, can be seen in the near
abandonment by many niche cable channels of original dramatic
programming in favor of reruns, syndicated programming, and
cheaper reality programming.183 The correlation between channel
abundance and responsiveness to minority audience preferences,
therefore, may be only as strong as is the substitutability of low and
high budget programming. To the extent that program investment is
either unimportant in satisfying the particular audience or can be
sources of entertainment.”) The shine of technological optimism on new
communications technologies is familiar. In a 1970 article heralding the
introduction of cable technology, a commentator gushed that “the stage is being set
for a communications revolution … there can come into homes and business places
… forms of information too numerous to specify … [making] every home and
office … a communications center of a breadth and flexibility to influence every
aspect of private and community life”. STREETER, supra note xx at 309 (quoting
Ralph Lee Smith).
181
Production quality is likely to decrease as programming volume increases for the
simple reason that it is becomes more difficult for any single channel to grow its
audience by showing higher quality programs. As a result, programmers will
simply produce or buy less expensive programs. See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra
note xx at 145-147 (showing how the marginal return on a dollar invested in
programs falls as channel volume increases); DOYLE, supra note xx at 62 (When
viewership falls short of a given level, program budgets will fall, creating a vicious
circle of declining product quality and declining audience share).
182
See Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates Limited, UK Television Content in the Digital
Age, at 12 (2004), at www.bbc.co.uk/info/policies/ukcontent_digital_age.pdf
[hereafter Television Content in the Digital Age]. Taking a documentary as an
example of a high-budget genre of appeal to a niche audience, the authors write that
even if a network “targets a lower audience of two or three million… the cost of the
documentary can probably not be financed by the advertisers’ value of [such an
audience]. Instead the niche network searches for lower-cost, low-audience
programming.” Id. at 14. It is unclear for how long reality programming will
remain low-cost. See, e.g., Brooks Barnes, Reality Checks: Unscripted Shows
Become a Money Pit, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 24, 2004, at A1 (describing
increasing salary demands by reality show “actors.”).
183
See NAPOLI, supra [Audience Economics] note xx at 177 (citing Court TV, the
History Channel, and Oxygen as examples); NEUMAN, supra note xx at 162 (“[A]n
increased diversity of channels … will [produce] an increase in the number of
channels providing mass-appeal content – as before, primarily action and comedy
entertainment, sports, and brief news headlines.”).

2004]

Media Policy Out of the Box

53

recouped over extensive product, temporal, or geographic markets,
then channel abundance will indeed lead to greater consumer
satisfaction. But to the extent that what is desired is high-cost
programming for smaller audiences, channel abundance will have the
opposite effect.
Let us now assume that digital technologies not only increase
channel abundance, but fundamentally change the economics of video
production. In the analog world, large audiences are required because
of the high risks and high costs associated with video products,
combined with imperfect price discrimination.184 If video markets are
to satisfy a greater range of tastes, then audience aggregation
requirements must relax. For this to happen, the costs of production
must plummet or the per-viewer revenue captured by producers must
increase, thereby relieving them from amassing audiences over large
geographic, temporal, and product markets.
Digital technology can lower the costs of content creation in
two different ways. First, digital production equipment like cameras
and recording media, and post-production equipment like editing
software, democratize the technical process of video production.185
As broadband networks speed up and proliferate, digital technology
will also reduce the cost of distribution. Second, digital networks and
technologies enable new ways to exploit creative talent that may
reduce creative costs. Peer production techniques, like those used in
open-source software, allow multiple creators to collaborate on media
product development.186 These techniques hold out the promise that
talented individuals, working for little or no compensation, can come
together to produce high quality content fairly cheaply, and then
distribute that content without the intermediation of media
conglomerates.
Of course this scenario assumes that talent is
plentiful and responsive to non-pecuniary rewards, and that
184

See supra notes xx and accompanying text.
Low budget films like the 1999 Blair Witch Project demonstrate this. DOYLE,
supra note xx at 116-117. It should be noted that digital distribution and
reproduction techniques also threaten investments in content by increasing the risks
of unauthorized and uncompensated consumption.
186
See Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of
Information, 52 DUKE L. J. 1245, 1254 (2003) (arguing that the digitally networked
environment increases the impact of nonmarket enterprises in cultural production
and, pointing to open software, a Mars mapping project, and online encyclopedia
project, the opportunities for “radically decentralized collaborative production”);
Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 401-405 (1999)
(describing five different organizational forms for the production of media products
ranging from corporate media to non market actors).
185
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disaggregated groups rival individuals or organized groups in the
quality of content they can produce. I will question these assumptions
below.
Independent of production models and associated costs, digital
distribution models can alleviate the pressure on producers to
aggregate large audiences, thus increasing service of taste minorities.
The most promising such distribution model involves more precise
price discrimination.187 A simple example shows how the number of
viewers that must be aggregated in order to support the production
and distribution of a program should fall with the introduction of
better price discrimination, assuming that marketing and distribution
costs remain constant.188 A cable channel typically requires a
subscriber base of at least 50 million households before most national
If that channel is
advertisers will purchase time on it.189
disaggregated and the programming sold directly to consumers, an
audience of 500,000 willing to pay $2 each to access a particular
program should suffice to support a program that cost $1,000,000
(including distribution and marketing costs).190
Reducing the
187

The likely economic effects of price discrimination on the video market are
contested. For a debate on the utility of price discrimination in television
programming, see Thomas W. Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation Politics Are Local:
A Response to Christopher Yoo’s Model of Broadcast Regulation, 53 EMORY L.J.
233, 234-5 (2004) (perfect price discrimination results in no consumer surplus
because no buyer pays less than the maximum price he is willing to pay) and
Christopher S. Yoo, The Role of Politics and Policy in Television Regulation, 53
EMORY L.J. 255, 267 (2004) (perfect price discrimination will result in consumer
surplus as measured by product characteristics in addition to price).
188
This assumption is probably unsound. See infra notes xx and accompanying
text.
189
Michael G. Baumann & Kent W. Mikkelsen, Benefits of Bundling and Costs of
Unbundling Cable Networks in Comments of the Walt Disney Company in A La
Carte and Themed Programming and Pricing Options for Programming Distribution
on Cable Television and Direct Broadcast Satellite Systems, MB Docket No. 04207, at 9 (F.C.C. filed July 15, 2004). General entertainment and sports cable
channels reach an average of 86.5 million subscribers and emerging niche channels
reach an average of 34.2 million subscribers. The average audience delivered is
842,000 for general entertainment and sports and 311,000 for emerging niche
channels. Booz Allen Hamilton, The a la Carte Paradox: Higher Consumer Costs
and Reduced Programming Diversity in Comments of the National Cable &
Telecommunications Association, in A La Carte and Themed Programming and
Pricing Options for Programming Distribution on Cable Television and Direct
Broadcast Satellite Systems, MB Docket No. 04-207, at 41 (F.C.C. filed July 15,
2004).
190
This would be a relatively meager sum for a video program. By the mid-1990’s
the average price for a half-hour comedy was $750,000 to $1 million and the price
for an hour-long drama was $1.5 to $2 million. TODREAS, supra note xx at 23.
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minimum audience size even more, a program might be marketed to
100,000 eager viewers for $4 the first day of release and then to
another 300,000 viewers for $2 a week later.191 Thus, a video product
distributed on-demand might well require a smaller audience than
would a product distributed on a cable network.
These two developments – lower production costs and greater
per-program revenue – may indeed change the economics of
programming gambles and lead to greater consumer satisfaction, but
only for some kinds of product categories. These are the very same
low-cost or mass audience productions that are already plentiful. As
even the greatest enthusiasts of peer production point out,
decentralized production works best for modular content.192
Examples would be games, reality programming, and current events
reporting that can reasonably be assembled from individual segments.
Scripted dramatic series, branded sports events, video involving
professional talent compensated at market rates, and well-researched,
comprehensive and accredited news compilations, are quite different.
These products require sizeable upfront investments and are not
modular in form. They are likely to remain the province of
hierarchical, not peer, production. 193 As such, they will benefit little
from the cost savings associated with distributed creation.
Whether working through peer networks or not, the ability of
video producers to make content cheaply depends heavily on labor
costs.194 Production cost savings will be concentrated within
programming genres that can economize on labor. Products like
reality or animated programming, in addition to amateur works, will
benefit most from digital advances in video production to the extent
191

For such a model to work, the first release would have to include copy protection
technology to limit the ability of the first group to share the programming with the
second group.
192
See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L. J. 369, 391 (2002) (arguing that peer production works so long as the
projects are modular, granular and easily integrated).
193
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, The Commercial Mass Media’s Continuing Fourth
Estate Role, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION supra note xx at 320-23,
330-38 (2002) (identifying the positive contributions to democracy of corporate
media and the limitations of peer-produced media in making the same
contributions); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our
System of Free Expression, 53 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1879, 1917-1926 (2000). See
also Baker, supra note xx [media concentration] at 244 (“digital technology
significantly reduces the cost or difficulty of making some media content… [but in
the main,] the Internet is a distribution system…[that] does not itself create
content.”).
194
See supra note xx.
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that labor is not the largest cost component.
Products like
professional sports, professional journalism, and certain kinds of
scripted dramas that have high labor costs are less likely to benefit
from these advances. 195
Like digital production techniques, digital distribution models
will not necessarily result in the production of programming that was
under-produced in the analog world. The effects of per-program,
direct-to-consumer sales will vary depending on program type and
audience size.196 High-cost programming that can command a
premium price either at one time, like sports events, or in the
aggregate over multiple temporal, product, or geographic windows,
like feature films or series with a well-developed market, may be
produced even for small audiences. But high-cost minority taste
programming that has no proven market, a limited market life, or
limited geographic appeal, will be much less likely to attract
investment even in an on-demand world. An example of this type of
programming would be a documentary an audience would pay to see
once, but that would have difficulty aggregating an audience over
time, space, or product categories. Such programming, if sold
directly to consumers, will still have to attract relatively large
audiences if it is to be produced.197 Low cost programming for a
195

See Television Content in the Digital Age, supra note xx at 28 (“digitisation …
is unlikely to change fundamentally the cost structure of the major forms of creative
endeavor – the action adventure film, the narrative TV drama, the original situation
comedy or the in-depth documentary [because] … [s]uch activities are fixed-cost,
labour-intensive endeavors.”).
196
The impact of on-demand programming will depend, in the first instance, on
public tolerance for paying for programming on a per-program basis. Experiments
with Internet pricing models of the early 1990’s showed that consumers prefer to
pay a flat fee than for metered usage. See, e.g., Bruce Abramson, From Investor
Fantasy to Regulatory Nightmare: Bad Network Economics and the Internet's
Inevitable Monopolists, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 159, 168 n.15 (2002). See also
Loretta Anania & Richard Jay Solomon, Flat-The Minimalist Price, in INTERNET
ECONOMICS, 91, 114-16 (Lee W. McKnight & Joseph P. Bailey eds., 1997)
(suggesting that a flat fee is the most economically efficient option for the Internet
and similar networks). While the on-demand supplier of DVD’s, Netflix, provides
subscription rates to its customers, subscribers are only allowed to rent three DVDs
at a time and cannot obtain the next three until the first three have been returned.
http://www.netflix.com. A subscription to this trickle of content is entirely unlike a
cable subscription. Services like Netflix, although significant improvements over
the real space video rental market in terms of consumer convenience, are unlikely to
supplant the market for cable and broadcast programming which is either free to the
viewer or part of a flat fee subscription.
197
The impact of on-demand sales on the programming market is in effect being
debated in the context of á la carte pricing for cable services. Cable programming is
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small audience or high-cost programming for large audiences will
benefit from on-demand sales.
Thus far, we have viewed the cost of programming as
independent of the distribution model. In fact, setting aside
production savings associated with digital technologies, the cost of
programming may increase with channel abundance and on-demand
sales. This is because program promotion becomes even more critical
and more expensive in a channel-rich environment.198 For a program
to attract even the smaller audience that might suffice in a world of
perfect price discrimination, it will need to be easily found. This may
entail obtaining a preferential place on an electronic program guide or
search portal.199 It will also require advertising, previews, or product
tie-ins in high volumes to reach a sustaining audience.200 Such
typically sold to the consumer on the basis of program tiers, each tier containing
multiple cable and broadcast networks. Prompted by a Congressional request, the
FCC has opened an inquiry into whether it should require cable and satellite
operators to unbundle their programming either by network or by theme to give
consumers better prices and more control over programming. Comment Requested
on A La Carte and Themed Tier Programming and Pricing Options for
Programming and Pricing Options for Programming Distribution on Cable
Television and Direct Broadcast Satellite Systems, 19 F.C.C.R. 9291 (2004). Cable
operators, and many networks argue that mandatory á la carte pricing would
decrease cable programming choice, and increase programming costs, because
network bundling subsidizes less popular cable channels with more popular ones.
See, e.g., National Cable & Telecommunications Association, The Pitfalls of A La
Carte: Fewer Choices, Less Diversity, Higher Prices (May 2004), available at
http://ncta.com/pdf_files/NCTA_White_Paper_-_Pitfalls_of_A_La_Carte.pdf
(arguing that bundled programming greatly increases diversity and that unbundled
networks would require substantial consumer investment in addressable digital
devices that make selective delivery possible); Video Competition Report, supra
note xx at 1705-06. See also OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 134 (program
bundling, by aggregating the demands of viewers who differ in their willingness to
pay for different services, supports some services that would not survive on a stand
alone basis).
198
Promotion has a special importance for unbundled programming sold directly to
consumers. So long as consumers have already paid for the programming as part of
a subscription service, or the programming is included in a free broadcast service,
the stakes in selecting programming are relatively low. These stakes rise
considerably if the consumer must pay before viewing.
199
See Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Services
Over Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. 1321, 1325 (2001) (discussing importance of electronic
program guides to the future of video programming).
200
Industry experts have predicted that unbundling cable networks for individual
sale would result in advertising losses of 20% to 60% as cable becomes a less
efficient advertising medium, and a substantial increase in network marketing
expenses. Today, networks bundled on cable tiers expend about 6% of revenues on
marketing, while stand-alone networks like HBO expend as much as 25% of
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marketing efforts increase the costs of programming and thus the
audience size (or premium price) necessary to support it.201 Increased
promotional costs put more pressure on audience aggregation,
especially for high-cost productions, and undermine some of the
benefits of price discrimination for smaller audiences.
In sum, the channel abundance and price discrimination that
digital technologies make possible are likely to make some kinds of
video production more responsive to smaller audience groups. New
efficiencies in video production could also help to correct narrow
market failures by increasing consumer satisfaction. But the impact
of these innovations on the overall makeup of video content must not
be over-stated. Because much video content will remain expensive,
and on-demand programming will not support all programming types,
some content will not be produced at optimal levels even as
distribution constraints relax. Expensive content that is demanded by
smaller audiences and that is either high-risk, or difficult to market,
will probably continue to be under-produced.
3. Industry Structure
The economics of video production have produced an industry
structure that, together with advertising and audience aggregation
pressures, can disrupt consumer sovereignty. The companies best
positioned to aggregate audiences and spread the risks of video
products are those that can exploit economies of scale at all stages of
the media production, distribution and promotion process.202 As a
result, the media industry is organized into “oligopoly market

revenues on marketing. See Booz Allen Hamilton, supra note xx at 27-28, 35. See
also of George Bodenheimer, President, ESPN Inc. & ABC Sports, before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp. (March 25, 2004), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1127&wit_id=2836 (“A la
carte will force all channels to expend millions of dollars in marketing…”).
201
In the context of unbundled cable networks, one study predicts that cable
operators would price average cable channels at $4 -$5 each per month. Booz Allen
Hamilton, supra note xx at 34.
202
See NEUMAN, supra note xx at 147 (“The returns to scale are dramatically higher
in information and communications than in most industries.”). The economies that
media industries pursue are more accurately described as economies of scale and
“economies of multiformity” which are realized from corporate operations in two or
more industries. Alan B. Albarran & John Dimmick, Concentration and Economies
of Multiformity in the Communication Industries, 9(4) J. OF MEDIA ECON. 41, 43
(1996) (identifying diversification, repurposing of content, and repurposing of talent
as three examples of economies of multiformity).
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structures and large scale multiproduct firms” with multiple
distribution and product assets.203
The impact of this market structure on competition is subject
to a lively economic debate.204 The economic inquiry focuses on
whether vertical efficiencies outweigh any potential anticompetitive
effects, taking into account any market dominance of the vertically
integrated firm, such that integration should be permitted. We need
not enter into that debate to understand how the organization of media
enterprises into large publicly traded, vertically and horizontally
integrated corporations might skew the production of video products,
contributing to narrow market failure.205 This section undertakes that
examination first in the analog sphere and then in the digital.
a) Analog Mediascape
Today, both the cable and broadcast industries are far more
concentrated than they were just a decade ago. The cable industry is
203

DOYLE, supra note xx at 29. This consolidation has been international in scope.
See, e.g., GILLIAN DOYLE, MEDIA OWNERSHIP: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
CONVERGENCE AND CONCENTRATION IN THE UK AND EUROPEAN MEDIA 4-5 (2002)
(“the trend that exists in the media – of increased concentration of ownership and
power into the hands of a few very large transnational corporations – clearly reflects
the overwhelming advantages that accrue to large scale firms.”).
204
According to today’s reigning economic theory, vertical integration should not
result in anticompetitive leveraging between downstream and upstream markets, or
in foreclosure in either market. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and
Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 187-205 (2002).
The D.C. Circuit has evinced just this skepticism over the dangers of vertical
concentration in relation to cable programming. See Time Warner Entertainment
Co., v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See generally HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 377 (2d ed. 1999) (citing Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook as
authorities for the position that vertical integration is not generally anticompetitive). This is as conventional a view today as it once was heretical. The
older orthodoxy was highly suspicious of vertical integration. See, e.g., Louis
Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515,
516-17 (1985). Some recent economic scholarship takes on the new orthodoxy and
supports this older suspicion. See, e.g., Tanseem Chipty, Vertical Integration,
Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry, 91
AM. ECON. REV. 428 (2001) (arguing that vertically integrated cable operators are
more likely to carry affiliated networks); Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Hal J. Singer,
Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case Study of the AOL/Time Warner
Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 631 (2001) (arguing that the merger between
AOL and Time Warner created the incentive and ability to engage in discrimination
in favor of affiliated content).
205
To be clear, the question pursued here is not whether integration is
anticompetitive such that regulatory intervention is warranted – the principal inquiry
of the economic literature -- but only whether integration influences video content
in ways that may not be responsive to consumer demand.
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dominated by Comcast and Time Warner Cable.206 The carriage
decisions of either of these companies, given their dominance overall
and in major markets, will often be sufficient to make or break a
programming network.207 A cable network granted carriage on
Comcast, which is dominant in 12 of the top 20 markets, has “the
equivalent of a full scholarship to Harvard,” as one journalist has put
it.208 The horizontal concentration of the cable industry is
complemented by a fairly high degree of vertical concentration. The
largest cable operators have significant holdings in much of the
content that they distribute.209 In 2003, 80% of the networks with
significant national penetration were owned or co-owned by only six
companies, of which five also dominate the broadcast network
program marketplace.210 The acquisition of a controlling interest in

206

Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1687, n. 561 (together, these
companies serve more than 34% of all those subscribing to a video service).
207
Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1687; In re Implementation of
Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992: Horizontal Ownership Limits, Third Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 19098,
19104 (1999) (“In most markets, a single incumbent cable operator is likely to have
more than 80% of the multichannel video distribution market.”).
208
George Anders, Want to Start a TV Channel? See Amy Banse, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Jan. 19, 2004, at B6 (commenting on Comcast investments in new
channels). The importance of the top cable operators lies in the fact that most
programming channels require distribution to thirty to fifty million households in
order to earn sufficient advertising revenue. See In re Time Warner, Inc., 123
F.T.C. 171, 207 (1997) (statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners
Janet D. Steiger and Christine A. Varney) (estimating that any new cable channel
must reach at least 40-60% of all subscribers in order to have a chance of
surviving). The range in numbers depends on whether the denominator can consist
of cable-only subscribers, numbering about 65 million households, or must include
all multichannel video subscribers, numbering about 94 million households. Video
Competition Report, supra note xx at 1609, 1622.
209
Until recently, the FCC had channel occupancy rules that limited cable operators
from owning more than 40% of the national video programming services that they
carry on the first 75 channels of their systems. 47 C.F.R. § 76.504. This rule was
reversed and remanded as arbitrary and capricious. Time Warner Entm’t Co., v.
FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1137-38 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
210
Comments of The Writers Guild of America, et al. in 2002 Biennial Regulatory
Review
Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB Docket No. 02-277, at 2 (F.C.C. filed
Jan. 2, 2003) (identifying 73 of 91 most popular cable networks). About 33% of all
national cable networks are vertically integrated. Video Competition Report, supra
note xx at 1690 (110 of 339 networks). Another statistic suggests slightly less
concentration. Eighteen of the top twenty programming networks in terms of
subscribership (excluding C-Span and the Weather Channel) are owned by one or
more of thirteen media companies. These are: Time Warner, Cablevision,
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DirecTV by News Corp., owner of the Fox Entertainment Group,
increases vertical integration within the programming distribution
sector.211
As with the cable industry, the broadcast industry has
consolidated in both the distribution and programming markets. In
the distribution market, the largest four national networks own almost
all of the major local stations in the top four media markets (New
York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia).212 These top four
markets cover about 17% of all television households and are
essential to any national advertising campaign.213 All of the major
networks have also engaged in upstream integration, combining with
or creating in-house production studios.214 Walt Disney Company,
Viacom, Fox Entertainment Group, and General Electric have come
to control the production and distribution of most content broadcast in
prime time. As of 2002, producers unaffiliated with the networks
accounted for only 8.7% of prime time content.215
There are two reasons why the concentration of economic
control over the production and distribution of video products, even if
not anticompetitive, might frustrate consumer choice. The first
concerns the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to engage in
strategic behavior to disadvantage competitors and to exploit
Comcast, Cox, Disney, E. W. Scripps Co., General Electric, Hearst, Liberty Media,
Advance Newhouse, News Corp., Viacom, and Vivendi. Id. at 1693.
211
See Subject to Conditions, Commission Approves Transaction Between General
Motors Corporation, Hughes Electronics Corporation and The News Corporation
Limited, Public Notice, FCC 03-328 (rel. Dec. 19, 2003). DirecTV currently has
12.32 million subscribers. Video Competition Report, supra note xx at App. B,
Table B-3.
212
NAB Comments at 32. Network ownership of stations in the top 24 television
markets is heavy as well.
213
COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note xx at 222.
214
See Einstein, supra note xx at 15. This consolidation succeeded repeal of the
financial interest and syndication rules, which had prohibited broadcast networks
from holding financials interests in the television programs they aired beyond firstrun exhibition and restricted the creation of in-house syndication units. See supra
note xx. Between 1990, when these rules were in full force, and 2002, seven years
after they had been repealed, the percentage of prime time programming supplied
by the networks themselves increased by more than 450% to nearly 75% of all
prime time programming. Einstein, supra note xx at 30-32.
215
Einstein, supra note xx at 26. See also Comments of Coalition for Program
Diversity in 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB
Docket No. 02-277, at 4-5 (F.C.C. filed Jan. 2, 2003) (contending that 68% of prime
time programming on the three largest broadcast networks used to be independently
produced versus 24% today.).
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efficiency gains to increase consumption of affiliated product.216 The
second relates to the culture of risk aversion and revenuemaximization that tends to permeate large and diversified
corporations.
In both cable and broadcast industries, programming
distributors and aggregators stand to benefit from strategic carriage
choices that favor affiliated content.217 The principal check on such
favoritism is that the vertically integrated firm that discriminates in
the upstream content market will experience downstream revenue
losses, assuming a competitive downstream market.218 Notably, in the
market for television programming, these losses will be blunted by the
way in which programming is bundled. The vertically integrated
distributor, such as Time Warner Cable, that forecloses a channel like
ESPN or ABC will indeed stand to experience downstream revenue
losses as subscribers switch to satellite.219 But most programming
216

See generally, Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA 4, 386
(1934). An example of strategic behavior would if Time Warner Cable used an
upstream asset, like its owned service, HBO, to raise the costs of distribution for a
downstream competitor like Echostar. Alternatively Time Warner could use its
downstream cable distribution asset to disadvantage upstream competitors, like
Showtime, by depriving Showtime of carriage or favorable carriage terms.
Efficiency gains might include “transaction efficiencies,” such as the costs Time
Warner saves in contracting for HBO, and economies of scale that the distributor
and programmer can realize by sharing creative or financial resources that are
difficult to contract for on an arms length basis.
217
See, e.g., DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN
CABLE TELEVISION 88 (1997) (“[C]able television systems do tend to favor their
affiliated cable networks . . . [sometimes] at the expense of rival, unaffiliated
networks.”). Fear of this kind of discrimination motivated Congress in the 1992
Cable Act to limit vertical integration. H.R. Rep. No. 862, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess.
56 at 42 (1992) (“vertically integrated companies reduce diversity in programming
by threatening the viability of rival cable programming services” and “have
impeded the creation of new programming services by refusing or threatening to
refuse carriage to such services that would compete with their existing
programming services.”). See also 138 Cong. Rec. S400, S418 (Jan. 27, 1992)
(“The danger of this kind of vertical integration is that a big cable company has a
financial incentive to carry the channels it owns on its many systems while denying
exposure to channels that might compete against it.”); 137 Cong. Rec. S2011,
S2012 (1991) (“[V]ertical integration has led some operators to discriminate in
favor of programming in which they have equity interests.”).
218
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 17273, 197-98 (1976) (arguing that the vertically integrated firm cannot leverage power
from one market into another or deter entry into either market unless it has market
power in both and there are barriers to entry by new competitors).
219
See WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note xx at 130 (“the lack of more than one or
two of the most well-known networks would seriously handicap a multichannel
competitor to an established cable system.”).
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channels are not “must have” networks that, if dropped or made
inconvenient to access, would alienate downstream subscribers.220
Whether a cable operator carries BBC America or Oxygen, or carries
them in a favorable position on the cable system, is unlikely to be
decisive in a consumer’s decision to subscribe.221 This is particularly
true where competition in the downstream distribution market is
marred by the failure of satellite to effectively substitute for cable for
many subscribers and by the barriers to new entrants in the
distribution market.222 Thus, a cable operator may well be able to
reap benefits from privileging affiliated programming without
suffering the downstream market costs that would ordinarily be
predicted.
Efficiency gains augment the incentives for vertically
integrated distributors to favor affiliated programming. Much of the
money to be made on affiliated programming comes from markets
that are ancillary to the downstream market.223 A vertically integrated
220

See TIMOTHY M. TODREAS, VALUE CREATION AND BRANDING IN TELEVISION’S
DIGITAL AGE 53 (1999).
221
A favorable position may be characterized by the service tier (e.g., the analog
service tier which is available to all subscribers or the digital service tier available
only to some), the channel number (e.g., in a channel neighborhood with other
popular programming), or the program guide (favorable display on the guide). See
e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-628, Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 at 41 (identifying “discriminating against rival
programming services with regard to price, channel positioning, and promotion” as
examples of prohibited acts by vertically integrated cable operators).
222
Although the two direct broadcast satellite companies, Echostar and DirecTV,
control 20% of the subscription television market, satellite service is not yet
substitutable for cable for the growing number of broadband cable subscribers
because it does not offer integrated broadband service. Broadband subscribers and
would-be subscribers have strong disincentives to switch to satellite even if they are
dissatisfied with cable programming, allowing cable operators a great deal of
competitive freedom to make programming decisions. See Written Ex Parte Filing
of the Walt Disney Company in CS Docket No. 00-30, at 34-35 (F.C.C. filed July
27, 2000) (“Cable . . . networks are the only distribution platforms capable of
delivering the full Interactive Television experience, and this is not likely to change
for the foreseeable future.”).
223
See supra notes xx and accompanying text. The empirical evidence supports the
contention that networks, whether in order to exploit the syndication market or to
recover costs of affiliated studios, do favor affiliated programming. See Einstein,
supra note xx at 30. Cf. id. at Appendix 3 at 24 (“It is generally believed that some
shows are being maintained on the network schedule for longer than they might be
if the network did not have an interest in the show.”). These same incentives lead to
the acquisition of network equity interests in unaffiliated programming that gains a
slot in the network schedule as a condition of airing. See NAB Comments, supra
note xx at 35. See also Einstein, supra note xx at 23 (“The television executives
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cable operator, for example, that carries, or merely promotes, its own
content at the expense of competitors’ content may be able to shore
up the market for tie-in merchandise, music, or DVDs. One need only
look at the pattern of media mergers and proposed mergers to see that
vertical integration is highly valued by distributors seeking synergies
through backward integration to defray the costs of content
acquisition over a greater audience base.224 If they own content, they
can more easily and cheaply repurpose that content over video-ondemand, multiple cable channels, and online channels.225 This is
especially true if vertically integrated distributors prominently feature
and heavily promote their affiliated content.
The absorption of the most prolific media companies into
large public corporations has an impact on video products that goes
beyond content decisions related to affiliation. The particular
corporate culture characteristic of large media conglomerates tends to
reinforce risk aversion and homogeneity in media products.
Journalism research suggests that the demands of the parent
corporation and its shareholders to meet quarterly earnings targets
affect the production and selection of media content.226 Emblematic
interviewed for this report agreed that networks would continue to increase their
level of program ownership in the coming years.”).
224
See generally, RYAN & WENTWORTH, supra note xx at 164-67. The desire to
exploit synergies in ancillary markets was an explicit motive in Comcast’s bid for
Disney in February 2004. See, e.g., Brigeitte Greenberg, Roberts Says Comcast will
Stay Committed to its Core Business, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY 9 (March 9, 2004)
(quoting Comcast CEO Brian Roberts as saying that Comcast “can help take
[Disney’s] content and the libraries and the portfolio of the … company and help
them to accelerate its growth rate” by combining distribution with content); Joe
Flint, Why Comcast Covets ESPN, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 13, 2004, at B1;
Martin Peers, Merger Could Alter Hollywood Balance of Power, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Feb. 13, 2004, at B1. See also Merissa Marr & Martin Peers, MGM’s
Library of Old Movies Puts It in Spotlight, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 7, 2004, at
A1 (illustrating the economic value of film archives for repackaging on cable,
DVD’s, the stage, and other venues).
225
For example, one of the benefits Time Warner saw in merging with Turner was
better coordination of program distribution and retailing strategies to boost retail
revenues from Time Warner’s cartoon characters. TODREAS, supra note xx at 151.
See also Larry Collette & Barry R. Litman, The Peculiar Economics of New
Broadcast Network Entry: The Case of United Paramount and Warner Bros., 10(4)
J. OF MEDIA ECON. 3, 10 n.5 (1997) (noting that Warner Bros. had been frustrated in
its attempts to cross promote its cartoon characters over multiple platforms so long
as the Fox television network distributed its cartoons because, for example, Fox
proposed eliminated the Batman series just when Warner Bros. was preparing to
release its Batman Forever movie and related product tie-ins).
226
See, e.g., PICARD, supra note xx at 182 (“New pressures for increased company
performance have been placed upon managers because of the obligations to
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of this Wall Street-driven approach to media production is the view of
General Electric’s Chairman, shortly after his company’s acquisition
of NBC. News, he said, would be treated as “a commodity or service
no different from ‘toasters, light bulbs or jet engines’ [and NBC News
would be expected] to make the same profit margins as every other
GE division” even at the expense of journalistic standards.227 These
financial pressures to satisfy Wall Street are made more acute by the
debt that many large diversified public corporations carry after a
major merger.228
Although aggressive earnings targets have led to explicit
corporate influence over journalistic output, such influence tends to
be more subtle and less easily policed.229 Among the most important
effects is an unduly heavy reliance on official sources and canned
reporting to produce content quickly, with minimal detectible error.230

shareholders … These market pressures have led to short-term thinking in some
media companies…”). This observation is not new. More than fifty years ago, the
Hutchins Commission bemoaned the commercial pressures on the media, resulting
in speech that “emphasizes the exceptional rather than the representative, the
sensational rather than the significant.” COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
supra note xx at 55. See generally, LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS
29-34 (1991).
227
DEAN ALGER, MEGAMEDIA: HOW GIANT CORPORATIONS DOMINATE MASS
MEDIA, DISTORT COMPETITION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY 169 (1998) (quoting
former NBC News President Lawrence Grossman quoting GE Chairman John F.
Welch).
228
See ALGER, supra note xx at 156.
229
Parent firms of newspapers have told editors and publishers that the news must
bend to advertiser interests. See, e.g., Comments of Consumer Federation of
America, et al. in 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules, MB Docket No. 02-277, at 41-48
(F.C.C. filed Jan. 2, 2003). Electronic media journalists have experienced the same
kinds of interference. See id. at 41-48 (citing call from GE CEO to NBC news
division, asking that there be nothing in the nightly news broadcast that might
depress GE stock prices); Jim Rutenberg, Disney Is Blocking Distribution of Film
That Criticizes Bush, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2004 at 1 (reporting on Disney’s blocking
of Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 9/11allegedly out of concern that the negative
portrayal of President Bush could jeopardize Disney tax breaks). See generally,
MCCHESNEY, supra note xx [Rich Media] at 53-63 (providing examples of editorial
choices influenced by corporate commercial interests and the enlisting of journalists
in support of the parent corporation’s business).
230
See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note xx at 292 (identifying the nonstop news cycle,
and the reliance on public officials, public relations entities, and other research
short- cuts as causes of soft reporting). For an excellent discussion of the pitfalls of
journalism’s top-down reporting based on official statements, see Herbert J. Gans,
DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS 45-68 (2003). See also DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM
HOYNES, BY INVITATION ONLY 105-137 (1994) (showing the effects of the limited
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These tendencies have contributed to influential media mistakes like
the early mis-reporting of the 2000 presidential election results and
the uncritical acceptance of government rationales for the 2003
invasion of Iraq.231 Journalistic shortcuts that save time and money,
taken to their extreme, result in the passing off of third party advocacy
pieces or press releases as reporting, leaving the public in the dark as
to the actual source of seemingly objective news.232
What the foregoing suggests is that media market structure,
itself a reaction to the costs and risks of cultural production, tends to
favor certain kinds of content. This is content in which the distributor
or aggregator has an interest and content that maximizes short-term
economic returns. It requires a leap from this observation to the claim
that, therefore, the media industry is not optimally responsive to
public demand. Empirical evidence that there is indeed public
demand for media products free from the influences and pressures
discussed above is lacking. Yet, the vocal grassroots objections to
media consolidation suggest that at least a portion of the public is
dissatisfied with the current media environment.233
Research
pool of experts consulted on television public affairs programs like Nightline and
what was then the McNeil/Lehrer News Hour).
231
The media relied on efficient, but monolithic, polling data for the 2000 election
making it difficult for any media outlet to independently predict election outcomes.
For a catalog of media shortfalls with respect to the 2000 presidential election, see,
e.g., Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of
Self-Restraint, 55 ALLR 1, 6-12 (2004). For a critique of the media’s war coverage,
see, e.g., SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, WEAPONS OF MASS DECEPTION:
THE USES OF PROPAGANDA IN BUSH’S WAR ON IRAQ 161-188 (2003) (criticizing the
news media for lack of critical coverage of the events leading up to, and the onset
of, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq); Brent Cunningham, Re-thinking Objectivity, in
OUR UNFREE PRESS: 100 YEARS OF RADICAL MEDIA CRITICISM 287, 294-295
(Robert W. McChesney & Ben Scott ed., 2004) (cataloging media failures to
challenge official statements on purpose and expected aftermath of preemptive
strike in Iraq). The relationship between public misperceptions about the war in
Iraq and media exposure is explored in Steven Kull, Misperceptions, The Media and
the Iraq War 12-19 (2003), at http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp (finding
that the majority of survey respondents reported misperceptions concerning the
discovery of weapons of mass destruction, world public opinion about the war
and/or links between Iraq and al-Qaeda; viewers of Fox, CBS, ABC, CNN, and
NBC evinced the highest concentration of misperceptions in that order; and higher
exposure to television news compounded the effect of political positions on the
frequency of misperceptions).
232
This happened, for example, when more than 40 television news stations aired
videos produced by the Department of Health and Human Services lauding recent
changes to Medicare. Amy Goldstein, GAO Says HHS Broke Laws With Medicare
Videos, WASHINGTON POST at A1 (May 20, 2004).
233
See supra note xx.
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revealing public loss of faith in media as a truth-teller suggests the
same thing.234
b) Digital Mediascape
How might digital innovations affect media industry structure
in order to improve responsiveness to public demand? Digital
technologies certainly facilitate the emergence of new challengers in
the competition for the viewer’s attention.235 Because distributed
digital networks allow an ordinary webcaster to attain the reach of an
NBC or Comcast, the Internet can loosen the bottleneck that has
existed in the upstream production and packaging of programming.
There will be less flex in the downstream market. Distribution choke
points will remain in the hands of broadband facilities owners like
cable. But even here, principles of nondiscrimination fashioned on a
common carrier model might well prevent such owners from favoring
their own content. 236
Notwithstanding these changes, digital technology is as
unlikely to remake media industry structure as it is to remake the
economics of media production and promotion. Indeed, because
production and promotion costs will remain high, the benefits of scale
and incumbency will remain in the digital world. It will remain
attractive for media companies to spread the risks of program
production over bigger taste and geographic markets.237 Moreover,
the composition of companies best able to exploit economies of scale
and scope will not change much. Open network architecture does not
234

See, e.g., DAVIS MERRITT, PUBLIC JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC LIFE: WHY
TELLING THE NEWS IS NOT ENOUGH xv (1995) (citing study that shows that citizens
with “great confidence” in television news and newspaper news fell from 55% to
25% and from 50% to 20% respectively between 1998 and 1993).
235
See, e.g., COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note xx at 135, 159 (the Internet has
reduced the power of concentrated media by creating the possibility for “diversity,
accessibility and affordability.”).
236
It is to achieve this free flow of data over broadband pipes that a number of
commentators have argued for media policy reforms that prevent broadband
distribution facilities from discriminating against content they do not own. See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 34-48 (2001); Mark A. Lemley and
Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the
Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 925 (2001); Mark Cooper,
Open Access to the Broadband Internet: Technical and Economic Discrimination
in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2000). These issues
are joined in the pending FCC Notice of Inquiry, Nondiscrimination in the
Distribution of Interactive Television Services Over Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. 1321
(2001).
237
The continuing value of distribution capacity to content companies is clear from
the News Corp.-DirecTV merger, while the continuing value of content to
companies with distribution capacity can be seen in the NBC-Universal merger.
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disempower the giants of content production, aggregation, and
distribution to the same degree that it empowers new content
producers. As new opportunities in media have arisen over the past
century, such as broadcasting and DVD’s, those at the top of the
media hierarchy have appropriated them.238 Given the logic of
capitalism, which restlessly pursues new markets, the very same
companies that control cable, satellite, broadcasting, and broadband
delivery will come to acquire significant holdings in the digital
mediascape.239 This is not to minimize the importance of new
entrants, but simply to suggest that big media is here to stay.
Audience behavior may be as important as internal industrial
logic in limiting the movement of media audiences to vanguard
providers. The most popular websites are provided by the big media
of cable and broadcast television.240 Even if the barriers to entry in
video markets fell, the willingness of consumers to spread their
attention over multiple outlets is relatively limited. Data show that
consumers with 100 or more channels typically watch only about
238

See COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note xx at 378-80.
The 2000 AOL-Time Warner merger was an example of this, although there the
new media company acquired the old media company. Smaller, but perhaps
ultimately more transformative, acquisitions going the other way seem to be the
trend today. See, e.g., Shelley Solheim, Comcast Buys Tech TV, PC MAGAZINE,
Mar. 26, 2004 at 1 (reporting on Comcast’s acquisition of Tech TV, which it has
merged with G4, both gaming channels aimed at male 12-34 year olds).
240
See, e.g., James G. Webster, et al, The Internet Audience: Web Use as Mass
Behavior, 46 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA, 1-12 (2002); Federal Communications
Commission, Study 8, Consumer Survey on Media Usage, prepared by Nielsen
Media
Research,
September
2002,
Question
9,
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A17.pdf (reporting
that 60% of survey respondents reported using web-based news sources affiliated
with major television and newspaper outlets); TVKey Facts About Media Markets
in America, Consumer Federation of America and Consumers Union at
http://www.democraticmedia.org/resources/filings/senatecom.pdf
(May
2003)
(reporting survey results showing that those who rely on online sources for news
tend to use the web sites of major television or newspaper outlets); Mathew
Hindman and Kenneth Neil Cukier, Measuring Media Concentration Online and
Offline, at http://www.cukier.com/writings/webmedia-jan04.htm (reporting on
large-scale study of online political information, showing that high-traffic sites
benefit from a “winners-take-all” pattern absorbing the vast majority of hits). For a
similar point concerning weblogs, see Clay Shirky, Power Laws, Weblogs, and
Inequality (2003), at http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html
(reporting research results showing that 50% of weblog traffic is directed to the top
12% of the blogs).
See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, It’s All About Control:
Rethinking Copyright in the New Information Landscape, in THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 79 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock
Netanel ed., 2002) (describing big media dominance in cyberspace).
239
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18.241 To the extent that promotion and branding are important in
retaining this audience loyalty, it is the large integrated media
company that has the resources to invest in and fully exploit strong
brands, allowing it to stabilize audience habits.242 In addition, wellbranded networks are able to extend their brands through the launch
of additional affiliated networks, like ESPN2 and ESPNews. By
increasing their dominance within a niche through channel
proliferation and cross-selling, incumbent providers can reduce
channel space or interest in rival networks.243
The impact of digital technologies on media industry structure,
as on other market features, will be mixed. Digital networks create
opportunities for new players to reach audiences, but the costs of
content development and promotion will remain barriers to entry.
Moreover, big media will be attentive to these opportunities,
exploiting them to retain consumer attention in the new media
environment.
4. Conclusion
This Section identified three related aspects of the production
and sale of video products that disturb the satisfaction of consumer
desires, resulting in narrow market failures. First, the very nature of
advertiser-supported media muffles the audience voice. Second,
programming costs and risks create pressures to aggregate large
audiences and to develop programming with proven broad appeal,
thus blunting the impact of distinct taste communities. Third, these
same pressures promote a market structure in which barriers to entry
are fairly high, vertical and horizontal scale is rewarded, and
programming choices are made with a view to satisfying short-term
corporate goals.
While new media dynamics in the form of digital abundance
and audience control may ameliorate some of the narrow market
failures, they will not correct them and may create new friction for the
241

Peter Grant, Manage TV-Channel Clutter, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 17,
2003, at R6 (citing Nielsen Media Research estimates that the average viewer
watches 15 out of 41-50 channels and 18 out of 121 or more channels). See also
GANS, supra note xx at 30 (predicting that the same viewer concentration patterns
will hold for Internet media sources).
242
See DOYLE, supra note xx at 145 (“the additional scale economies made possible
by digitization” may increase big media’s advantage in branding). See also
TODREAS, supra note xx 182-187 (discussing power of incumbent brands in digital
environment).
243
See, e.g., Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
16 FCCR 17312, 17323-25 (2001).
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sovereign consumer. Audience control over advertising exposure
may reduce advertisers’ power over program content, thereby
amplifying the consumer’s voice in content choices. More perfect
price discrimination, especially when combined with new production
efficiencies, may make media more responsive to the tastes of small
audiences. As for industry structure, big media will probably have to
share the audience with new content originators and distribution
channels.
This said, innovations resulting from new revenue and
distribution models and new entry will be limited, benefiting some
audience constituencies, but not others. In particular, product gaps
will remain in entertainment and news programming that is expensive
to produce and unlikely to aggregate large audiences across product,
temporal, and geographic markets. Examples include documentary
films and investigative journalism requiring significant research and
upfront investment, news commentary and reporting not unduly
reliant on government or commercial official statements, and certain
kinds of scripted dramatic series or films. Given these continuing
gaps, market correction will continue to be a valid objective of media
policy where narrow market failures persist.
C. Broad Market Failures and Market Supplementation
The market correction justification for media policy, as Part II
showed, conceives of the consumer as sovereign and is largely
reactive. Media policy fashioned along these lines is, like the
imperfect market, at the service of existing consumer wants. As Part
II also suggested, the achievement of media policy goals depends on
aspirations that extend beyond consumer satisfaction. Even if the
market could give consumers exactly what they wanted, our media
would not necessarily deliver what a strong democracy and civil
society needs in terms of exposure to diversity, the forging of
solidarity, and elevation outside of market exchanges. That is
because there are broad failures of the market to internalize the value
of these goods. These aspirations thus call for supplementation of
even well-functioning markets. Yet digital networks challenge the
efficacy of supplementation efforts. The following subsections
identify past responses to broad market failures and show how digital
technologies undermine these responses.
1. Availability Mechanism in the Analog Mediascape
Market supplementation assumes that: (1) policy interventions
can increase the production and distribution of media products that
further media policy goals; (2) if such increases take place,
individuals will consume and be affected by these products; and (3)
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this consumption has social and political salience that transcends the
value of consumer sovereignty. As an instrumental matter, the second
link in this chain is the most critical, and it is the weakest. It is
weakest because it assumes that consumption flows naturally from the
availability of content – a process that I call the “availability
mechanism.” Policy interventions into the market, whether to correct
narrow market failures or provide a diversion around broad ones, have
encouraged or sponsored media products that are simply made
available. If the products are meant simply to satisfy consumer
demand, availability is perhaps all that is required.244 But the
availability mechanism is far less reliable in addressing broad market
failures by bringing audiences to content that they have not
demanded.
To be sure, it is possible for some kinds of media products to
produce classic third-party positive externalities even if the
availability mechanism fails and there is very little audience
exposure.245 Prime examples of this kind of product are investigative
reporting and even the passive filming of public bodies. The press
may serve a “watchdog” function of exposing and deterring abuses
simply by documenting proceedings, even if no one is watching.246
Weblogs behave this way by circulating reports read by relatively
few, but then picked up by other media organs for more general
consumption.247
However, most media products will not produce benefits
without being consumed. Even if reporting has some impact without
an audience, an audience will be necessary to maximize the rhetorical
power of a report. An audience will also be required whenever the
positive value inheres in the experience of the media product itself
244

It should be noted that even if a consumer would choose a product if he knew
about it, the consumer might remain ignorant of such products in a cluttered digital
mediascape dominated by proprietary digital portals and search engines and heavily
dependent on promotion.
245
Civic republican theory, for example, holds that even those not directly exposed
will benefit from those who are because well-informed people are likely to improve
social, cultural, and political interactions. See Cass Sunstein, A New Deal for Free
Speech, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 137, 155-56 (1994).
246
For arguments about the importance of the press as a surrogate for the public in
the policing of the powerful, see David L. Protess et al, THE JOURNALISM OF
OUTRAGE: INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND AGENDA BUILDING IN AMERICA (1991);
Justice Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1975).
247
See, e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION, 133-141 (1999)
(discussing the catalytic effect of the Drudge Report’s website report on the sex
scandal involving President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, leading to an explosion
of mainstream media coverage).
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and in the content conveyed, rather than in the raw information or the
mere fact of production. This will be true, for example, for films,
commentary, cultural events, dramas, satire, and sporting events, as
well as news productions that seek to inform the public as well as
affect the newsmakers. Content has no power to increase social
solidarity or to expose citizens to diverse viewpoints without
amassing an audience.
In the analog world of channel scarcity and audience passivity,
the problems with the availability mechanism were muted.
Consumers could be expected to stumble across and consume content
they did not initially demand because they were hungry for video
content. Channel abundance and audience control make these
expectations unreasonable and, as discussed below, require new
approaches to market supplementation.
2. Availability Mechanism in the Digital Mediascape
Digital abundance and consumer control undermine the
availability mechanism in two ways. They create an attention deficit
by taking eyes away from content responsive to proactive media
policy goals and they dilute the quality of attention even when the
audience is “tuned in.”
The claim that video consumption might yield solidarity or
exposure to difference has always been fragile. Theorists like Robert
Putnam are suspicious of the media’s role in strengthening civic life
and even blame television for destroying the social ties that existed
when people spent leisure time on community pursuits.248 Whatever
its drain on real-space activities, however, there is evidence that
television had the power to expose the public to difference and forge
consensus simply by being available.249 This power was created by,
and largely dependent on, under conditions of channel scarcity and
248

Robert Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social
Capital in America, 28 POL. SCI. AND POLITICS, [cite] (1995) (defining social
capital as “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.”). Similar
views are common in relation to the destruction of Habermas’ public sphere. See,
e.g., PRICE, supra note xx at 28 (“broadcasting has become, at best, irrelevant to the
operation of a democratic society and, at worst, so implicated in the harmful
transformation of culture that the possibility of recuperation for an effectively
institutionalized public sphere is dim indeed.”). See also ROBERT M. ENTMAN,
DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS: MEDIA AND THE DECAY OF AMERICAN POLITICS
17-30 (1989).
249
See, e.g., Elihu Katz, And Deliver Us From Segmentation, in Roger G. Noll &
Monroe E. Price, A COMMUNICATIONS CORNUCOPIA 99, 106 (1998) (“the shared
experience of viewing [a single channel in Israel] often made for conversation
across ideological divides.”).
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attention abundance. The increase in content options over digital
media, by fragmenting the audience and fraying attention, reduces
audience exposure to products responsive to broad market failures.250
Thus, while market segmentation may mean more satisfaction of
existing tastes, it likely means less common exposure to different
tastes, less communion over shared tastes, and less provocation to
change tastes.
Today, as the late media scholar Elihu Katz lamented,
television “no longer serves as the central civic space; one can no
longer be certain that one is viewing together with everybody else or
even anybody else”.251 Taking advantage of interactive tools or
distracted by a multitude of video options, consumers can easily
choose not to be exposed to content that furthers media policy goals.
Cass Sunstein’s book, Republic.com, expresses concern that Internet
services reduce exposure to solidarity goods.252 Others have observed
that personal video recorders and digital program guides operating in
traditional television media reduce the likelihood that consumers will
be exposed to media content they did not seek or will converge on the
same programming in a democratically significant way.253 Given
250

See supra notes xx and accompanying text. See also ANG, supra note xx at 1545. (“[W]hen ‘anarchic’ viewer practices such as zapping and zipping became
visible, when viewing contexts and preferences began to multiply, … the industry
… had to come to terms with the irrevocably changeable and capricious nature of
‘watching television’ as an activity.”); DENIS MCQUAIL, MCQUAIL’S MASS
COMMUNICATION THEORY, 407-410 (4th ed. 2003).
251
Katz, supra note xx at 101.
252
Sunstein’s stalking horse, drawn from the online context, is the Daily Me news
service that speaks to the user’s existing tastes and filters out information with
which he does not agree or does not care about. SUNSTEIN, supra note xx[republic]
at 206 (“To the extent that numerous people are ‘personalizing’ … their experience
through the creation of specifically tailored communications packages, there may
well be a problem from the democratic point of view.”). See also James W. Carey,
Community, Public, and Journalism in MIXED NEWS, 1, 14 (in Jay Black ed.,
1997)(earlier raising the dangers of tailored news in cyberspace in the form of a
“Daily Me” news service). But cf. Hunter, supra note xx at 627-637 (arguing that
there is no such thing as perfect filtering and fears on this score are greatly
exaggerated).
253
NAPOLI, supra note xx at 150 (“[I]ncreases in the diversity of content can lead to
decreases in the diversity of exposure … [such that] the objectives inherent in the
marketplace of ideas metaphor may actually be undermined, rather than fulfilled, by
policies designed to increase the diversity of content options available.”) See also
J.G. Webster & P. F. Phalen, Victim, Consumer, or Commodity? Audience Models
in Communications Policy in AUDIENCEMAKING: HOW THE MEDIA CREATE THE
AUDIENCE 35 (J.S. Ettema & D.C. Whitney ed., 1994) (“If increasing diversity of
content means that each individual is actually exposed to less diversity of
expression, it’s hard to see how such a result facilitates the marketplace of ideas.”).
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quantity and control, viewers may deprive themselves of the shared
experiences that are important to careful deliberation in a democracy.
Digital technologies weaken the availability mechanism even
when content penetrates information blizzards and information shields
to reach the public. The potency of any particular program to fulfill
media policy goals will diminish with over-exposure and a reduction
of quality attention.254 One the most striking statistics about media
usage is that the increased use of one media tool does not result in a
corresponding decrease in others. For example, average television
viewing increased between 1998 and 2001 from 1,551 to 1,661 hours
per year. Over the same period, average annual consumer Internet
usage increased from 54 to 134 hours and average annual video game
usage increased from 43 to 78 hours.255 Some of the gain in screen
time came at the expense of books and other leisure activities, but
much of the increase was due to simultaneous usage of video media
and a net increase in screen time.256 This amount of total and
simultaneous screen time tends to result in an information flow that
“exceeds the interpretative capacity of the subject.”257 The
overexposed and restless audience, even when reached by the
availability mechanism, may not be reached in a meaningful way.
It is not just the amount of information that is taxing, but also
the degree to which viewers are responsible for the critical functions
once exercised by content providers.258 Knowing the fragility of
their audience’s attention, entertainment producers emphasize the
sexy, violent, profane, graphic, and fast, sometimes at the expense of
the more enduringly provocative.259 News and information producers
254

The use of “blizzard” in connection with information overload comes from the
postmodernist theorist Jean Braudrillard. See, e.g. JEAN BRUADRILLARD, Mass
Media Culture, in REVENGE OF THE CRYSTAL: SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE
MODERN OBJECT AND ITS DESTINY, 1968-1983 (Paul Foss & Julian Pefanis, eds.
and trans. 1990). See generally STEVENSON, supra note xx at 157-161.
255
U.S. Bureau of Census, supra note xx at 720.
256
Id. Video game usage and Internet usage are projected to increase by about 40%
and 60% respectively by 2006. Even television viewing is expected to increase
along with the total number of hours per person per year devoted to media
consumption. Id.
257
STEVENSON, supra note xx at 157.
258
See KEANE, supra note xx at 182-3 (discussing Jean Baudrillard’s theory “that
citizens will become trapped in a never-ending blizzard of information, without
adequate free time to digest or make sense of the information flows which envelop
them.”).
259
See, e.g., CROTEAU & HOYNES, supra note xx at 157-62 (citing proliferation of
programming with shock value, including wild animal attacks, tabloid gossip,
dysfunctional families, reality programming, sex, violence, and spectacle); Nancy
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too tend to privilege the sensational and fast-moving over nuanced
analysis.260 One of the consequences of channel proliferation is that
news services are under growing pressure to reach an audience first,
and to reach it audaciously.261 Viewers click remote control devices
between 36 and 107 times an hour and three-quarters of Americans
under thirty watch the news with a remote in hand.262 Producers
cannot afford to tarry over content, whether by delaying release
pending additional fact-gathering or by composing a slower story with
greater critical nuance.263 More and more information reaches the
viewer in a fairly undigested form. This sort of stream-ofconsciousness reportage has the benefit of reducing the editor’s
control over public opinion.264 At the same time, it burdens the
audience’s already strained attention to make sense of information.
Although digital technology undermines the availability
mechanism as a means for pursuing the proactive agenda of media
policy, it opens up new possibilities for such pursuits as well. It is
with these that I conclude in the next section.
IV. Out of the Box Public Service Media
The vulnerability of the availability mechanism in the digital
era impacts all facets of media policy, including both regulations and
subsidies. But it is in the realm of media subsidies that media policy
can make the most substantial strides in addressing broad market
failures in the digital environment. The current system of federal
deWolf Smith, Slices of Life, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 25, 2004, at W2 (noting
the popularity of plastic surgery programs like The Swan and Nip/Tuck, the latter of
which was the top rated new series on basic cable in 2003). See also TODD GITLIN,
MEDIA UNLIMITED: HOW THE TORRENT OF IMAGES AND SOUNDS OVERWHELMS
OUR LIVES 87-95 (2003) (discussing the increase in frames per second and cutaway
shots in film and video products).
260
LARRY SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY 6 (1991) (arguing that ratings pressures lead
to press obsession with “gossip rather than governance” and “titillation rather than
scrutiny”).
261
New research on the implications of the rush to “firstness” identifies a “spin
bias” in the news that emerges from news outlets that ride on, and magnify, the spin
created by other news outlets without independent deliberation or perspective.
Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer, Media Bias (MIT Department of
Economics Working Paper No. 02-33), at http://ssrn.com/abstratct_id=335800).
262
GITLIN, supra note xx at 72.
263
See HERBERT J. GANS, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS 49-54 (2003) (describing the
various tactics news organizations employ to mass produce news); GITLIN, supra
note xx at 96-97 (describing the affects of the sound bite on news production).
264
See, e.g., Ithiel de Sola Pool, Direct-Broadcast Satellites and Cultural Integrity
in TELEVISION IN SOCIETY 231 (Arthur Asa Berger ed., 1987) (“Simultaneous radio
coverage of war, a moon walk or whatever absorbs and fascinates the mass audience
directly, cuts out traditional local purveyors of information and interpretation.”).
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media subsidies centers upon fairly meager support for public
broadcasting265 and even more limited support for media production
outside of the broadcasting system.266 These subsidy programs are
flawed in manifold ways.267 The object here is not to propose specific
institutional reforms, although institutional and legal reforms are
necessary, but to show how media subsidies can further the proactive
media policy agenda amid content abundance and attention scarcity.
The first step is a commitment to subsidies as a major, not marginal,
instrument of media policy.
A. Subsidy Policy and The First Amendment
Subsidies for the creation and dissemination of content that
supplements the market are the most effective and constitutionally
sound way to further proactive media policy goals.
Consider the following regulation. To enhance speech
diversity, the FCC orders television broadcasters to devote some of
their digital transmission capacity to entertainment or informational
programming “concerning issues related to minority audiences within
the broadcaster’s community.” At the outset, we can observe that
even if such a rule were constitutional, it would not necessarily have
the effect of enhancing robust and antagonistic exchange in a
marketplace of ideas. It might satisfy under-served audience
segments, although even the achievement of this reactive goal is
questionable given the resources it would take to develop compelling

265

Federal appropriations for public broadcasting activities were about $378 million
in 2003, constituting approximately 15% of public broadcasting revenues. CPB
Appropriation History, at http://www.cpb.org/about/funding/appropriation.html.
266
These funds are made available primarily through the National Endowment for
the Humanities. NEH funding for all projects, including video media, has fallen
precipitously over the last decade from $140.6 million and 2195 grants awarded in
1990 to $106.8 million and 1290 grants awarded in 2001. U.S. Bureau of Census,
supra note xx at 772. Funds made available through the National Endowment for
the Arts, typically for non-video media, have fallen even more dramatically from
$170.8 million and 4475 grants awarded in 1990 to $94 million and 2093 grants
awarded in 2001. Id.
267
The public broadcasting system is famously troubled and beset by controversy as
to its organization and output. See, e.g., QUALITY TIME? THE REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC TELEVISION (1993) (reviewing
the problems, and recommending reform, of the public broadcasting system).
Critiques of public broadcasting have come from both the left, see, e.g., JAMES
LEDBETTER, MADE POSSIBLE BY…: THE DEATH OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN THE
UNITED STATES (1997) (arguing that public television has adopted commerciallydriven strategies), and the right, see, e.g., PUBLIC BROADCASTING & THE PUBLIC
TRUST (David Horowitz & Laurence Jarvik ed., 1995) (including essays arguing
that public television has been captured by the left).
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programming. But it would not involve audiences without preexisting
interest in such minority issues.
Even if the regulation were effective, it would encounter
serious constitutional problems. Policies that seek to promote
particular types of media content, like the “minority programming
regulation,” will in many cases be content-based.268 Content-based
regulations will generally only pass muster under the First
Amendment if they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.269 Although the Supreme Court has applied a
less stringent standard to content-based regulations of broadcasting on
the grounds that broadcast frequencies are scarce,270 this relaxed
scrutiny has not been extended to other electronic media.271
Moreover, its continued vitality with respect even to broadcast media
is in considerable doubt.272 The consensus opinion is that it is just a
268

Speech regulations that the government has adopted “because of [agreement or]
disagreement with the message it conveys” are content-based. Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1980). By contrast, speech regulations that
favor or disfavor speech without reference to the ideas or views such speech
expresses are content-neutral. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
269
See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See generally, KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 212-217 (2nd ed.
2003). Content-neutral regulations are subjected to an intermediate level of
scrutiny, and are permissible if they are narrowly tailored to further an important or
substantial governmental interest. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
270
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-92 (1969) (upholding Fairness
Doctrine requirement that broadcasters provide opposing viewpoints on matters of
controversy on grounds that broadcasting required access to physically scarce
airwaves licensed by government); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943)
(upholding broadcast ownership regulations on grounds of the scarcity of broadcast
airwaves).
271
See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 51 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (rejecting Red Lion’s First
Amendment approach for Internet regulations); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 637-41 (1994) (rejecting Red Lion’s First Amendment approach for
cable television regulations). Cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding
Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 146 (Red Lion has
had “rather little gravitational force”).
272
The First Amendment exceptionalism for broadcasting has been criticized in the
academic literature, see, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the
Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003);
Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1993);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today: A
Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L. J. 151, 151-52;
Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982), and in the courts, see, e.g., FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) (acknowledging criticism of
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matter of time before the Supreme Court buries the scarcity rationale,
subjecting broadcast regulation to the same scrutiny as other types of
speech regulation.273 The result will be an even heavier reliance on
content-neutral structural regulations (e.g., ownership restrictions),
which themselves are being subjected to more rigorous constitutional
scrutiny as courts grow more solicitous of corporate speech.274 The
bottom line is that the “minority programming regulation” will be
constitutional, if at all, only for broadcasting – a diminishing
component of the digital mediascape – and only for the near term.
The use of subsidies, in the form of cash or non-cash
incentives, permits government to pursue media policy goals across
all media and with far less formidable First Amendment constraints.
Moreover, subsidies are most effective in advancing a proactive
media policy agenda. Let us replace our minority programming
regulation with a subsidy in the form of a grant for multi-media
content concerning minority populations. Suppose that grant criteria
include indicia of content quality and a compelling outreach program
using such techniques as search engines, community screenings and
events, school curricula, blogs, and marketing to increase exposure.
Government grants are subject to far less exacting First
Amendment review than are government regulations.275
The
“minority programming subsidy” would almost certainly be
constitutional, even though it discriminates on the basis of content, so
long as a preference for “minority programming” was not a cover for
invidious viewpoint discrimination.276 This is not to say that the
the scarcity doctrine in light of new communications technologies, but asserting
Court’s unwillingness “to reconsider [its] longstanding approach without some
signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so
far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required.”);
Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing scarcity as basis of
special First Amendment treatment for broadcasting).
273
See, e.g., Phil Weiser, Promoting Informed Deliberation and A First Amendment
Doctrine for a digital Age: Toward a New Regulatory Regime for Broadcast
Regulation, in DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE MEDIA 11 (Simone
Chambers 7 Anne Costain eds., 2000). The FCC itself repudiated the scarcity
rationale when it abrogated large parts of the Fairness Doctrine. Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5843 (1987), aff’d sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC,
867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
274
See Baker, supra note xx [Media Concentration].
275
See Goodman, supra note xx at 231-38.
276
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding
against facial challenge federal art subsidies conditioned on artistic merit and
general standards of decency). Some public broadcasting entities today are not
only subsidized by the federal government, but are themselves government entities.
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value judgments involved in selecting media projects to subsidize will
never call for constitutional scrutiny. The tensions between policy
goals and the free speech interests of grantees are evident in the
implementation of tax policy,277 copyright policy,278 and of course
broadcast policy.279 In the context of public service media, these
tensions have been addressed to some extent by interposing
institutional buffers like the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
between producers and government.280 Given the inherently political
process of subsidizing media, these buffers will always be under
pressure.281 Steps that make media subsidies more effective will
intensify constitutional scrutiny, but they need not increase
constitutional infirmity. It is to these steps that we now turn.

In such cases, the media content choices they make may constitute government
speech, which is subject to even more permissive First Amendment standards. See
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding federal subsidies that discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint on the grounds that the government is not penalizing
speech, but ensuring that public funds be spent for authorized purposes.);
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995) (in striking down public university’s policy forbidding the use of subsidies
for student publications by those that promote or manifest religious belief, clarifying
that viewpoint discrimination is only permissible when government itself is the
speaker). But cf. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673-4
(1998) (in upholding right of state-owned public television station to exclude
qualified candidate from station-sponsored political debate, relying on the fact that
the station’s selection criteria were viewpoint neutral). See generally, Randall P.
Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1377, 1437-45 (2001).
277
See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (striking
down state sales tax that exempted particular kinds of magazines for
unconstitutional content-based discrimination within a class of media).
278
See Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337 (4th
Cir. 2001) (upholding copyright subsidies, in the form of a compulsory copyright
license, for satellite broadcasters that carry local broadcast stations against a claim
that such subsidies unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of local content).
279
See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (invalidating federal
statutory prohibition on editorializing by noncommercial broadcast stations
receiving public funds as unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech).
280
47 U.S.C. 396 (2003)(authorizing the establishment of a nonprofit Corporation
for Public Broadcasting to funnel federal funds to noncommercial television and
radio stations and producers).
281
For example, public broadcasting is continually subject to political attack for its
performance on the statutory goal that CPB-grantees pursue “objectivity and
balance” in their programming. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (2003). See, e.g., Ken
Auletta, Big Bird Flies Right, THE NEW YORKER, JUNE 7, 2004, at 42 (reporting on
political pressure exerted on PBS for allegedly left-leaning programming).
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B. Possibilities for Reform
If media policy is to address broad market failures as well as
narrow ones, to broaden exposure to difference, increase social
integration, and provide meaningful non-market content alternatives,
it can only be by taking more seriously the availability mechanism’s
limitations. It can only be by tackling content consumption as well as
content availability in the digital mediascape. Scholars are beginning
to recognize the importance of consumer exposure, as well as media
supply, to the achievement of media policy goals.282 Several have
urged in general terms,283 or in more specific ones,284 that government
should invest more in public service media content. These proposals,
although headed in the right direction, do not adequately address the
implications of content abundance and attention scarcity. Additional
screen clutter, without more, will not achieve proactive media policy
goals.285
The “more” that is needed is a public service media agenda
focused on two clear goals. First, subsidies should be targeted to
respond to narrow market failures by supporting the production of
content that will be under-produced even in the digital era. These
products were identified in Part III.286 Persistent challenges to public
282

See, e.g., NAPOLI, supra note xx [Foundations] at 146-152 (arguing that
“exposure diversity” or patterns of media consumption by individuals (vertical) and
across fragmented media offerings (horizontal) ought to be taken into account in
formulating diversity policy).
283
See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note xx at 305-307 [Rich Media]; BAKER, supra
note xx at 116.
284
Some have proposed the creation of new deliberative Internet domains
SUNSTEIN, supra note xx at 170-72; ANDREW SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION
205 (1999) (proposing a PublicNet domain to showcase underrepresented artists and
activists, whose icon would appear on desktops and browsers). They have also
proposed that government subsidize cyberspace content to encourage public debate.
SUNSTEIN, supra note xx at 180-2. These proposals are on top of proposals to
revive and extend erstwhile broadcast regulations, like the Fairness Doctrine, into
cyberspace, for example by requiring linking to contrasting perspectives.
SUNSTEIN, supra note xx at 186-9.
285
As Dan Hunter has noted wryly with respect to Sunstein’s proposals: “This is
Cass as Kevin Costner: ‘If you build it, they will come.’ The sad truth is that they
will not come. They will not even know it exists. And even if they did, the people
about whom we should be concerned will filter it out.” Dan Hunter, Philippic.com,
90 CAL. L. REV. 611, 664 (2002) (book review). See also TRACEY, supra note xx at
280 (making a similar point about public broadcasting whose “heady optimism
about ordinary folk … [is a] “’field of dreams’ optimism: build the institution as a
vehicle for superior entertainment, quality journalism, insight and boldness,
excellence in all that is done – construct that architecture – and they will come.”).
286
See supra notes xx and accompanying text.
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service media on the grounds that niche channels like Discovery and
CSPAN now provide adequate commercial substitutes miss this
point.287 As we have seen, digital networks will reduce, but not
eliminate, narrow market failures. There is likely to continue to be an
underproduction of programming that is high-risk and high-cost, and
that appeals to smaller audience segments.288
Second, public service media should look beyond the
availability mechanism in supplementing the market. If media
subsidies are to advance both proactive and reactive policy agendas,
they must boost consumption of, and critical engagement with, the
content they support. This may involve outreach to promote content
using the tools of digital media, such as program guides and search
engines. It may involve the production of new forms of content such
as virtual reality games or the sponsorship of peer-produced content
and the use of all media platforms, including broadband. Most
centrally, it requires efforts to foster meaningful exposure to content,
of whatever type and distributed by whatever means.
The public journalism movement shows how some segments
of the commercial press are attempting to respond to information
abundance and attention scarcity. In the early 1990’s, print journalists
began to develop a theory of journalism that challenged the
conception of journalists as dispassionate observers. Instead, what
came to be called civic or public journalism vested journalists with a
responsibility to promote active deliberation over issues of common
287

See, e.g. John Motavalli, PBS Facing Crisis: Infighting, Low Ratings, Lack of
Hits Put Added Pressure on Public TV, TELEVISION WEEK at 1 (Oct. 20, 2003)
(discussing “serious challenge” to public television posed by niche cable channels).
288
One need only compare the critical awards garnered by public television and
commercial television documentaries to perceive that the two kinds of product
perform different functions. From 1998-2002, public television received 40
Peabody awards, widely considered the most prestigious award for excellence in
television. This is nearly twice as many as any other television programmer (HBO
received 21 in this period) and four times more than any of the commercial
broadcast
networks
(ABC
received
10).
Data
gathered
from
http://www.peabody.uga.edu. Between 1999 and 2003, public broadcasting was the
only television winner of the duPont-Columbia gold baton for news excellence,
winning for a documentary on the rise of Islamic terrorism, a documentary about
post-apartheid South Africa, and for the Nova series’ excellence in science
reporting. Data gathered from http://www.jrn.columbia.edu/events/dupont/. For an
enlightening study of how the goals and methods of public television production
differ from those of commercial television, see DORNFELD, supra note xx at 181
(describing a producer’s struggle “to traverse the gap between the popular
sensibilities historically attributed to and expected from television … and the
demands of ‘enlightened’ educational enrichment – with its scientific authenticity
and substantiality, verbal exposition, and extractable intellectual conclusions.”).
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concern and enhance the problem-solving capabilities of citizens.289
According to one of the public journalism movement’s leaders, the
movement “is about forming as much as informing a public.”290 In
what others have called an effort to increase “social capital,” those
engaged in public journalism seek to further exposure to difference
and consensus over the common.291 Here is the aspirational aspect of
media policy laid bare.292 In order to satisfy these aspirations, public
journalism has pioneered the use of digital tools and real space events
to capture audience attention.293
Digital technologies provide new tools as well as new
challenges for a proactive policy agenda. In the spirit of the public
journalism movement, policy interventions aimed at exposing viewers
to programming with positive externalities could use the same digital
tools that commercial media use to aggregate audiences.294 It turns
out, for example, that consumers are drawn to the same content that
others are consuming.295 Digital technologies exploit these
289

A popular explication of the public journalism philosophy is in JAMES FALLOWS,
BREAKING THE NEWS (1996). See generally, Lewis A. Friedland & Sandy Nichols,
Measuring Civic Journalism’s Progress: A Report Across a Decade of Activity (A
Study Conducted for The Pew Center for Civic Journalism) 5-15 (2002), at
http://www.pewcenter.org/doingcj/research/index.html.
290
Paul McMasters, A First Amendment Perspective on Public Journalism in
MIXED NEWS 188, 191 (Jay Black ed., 1997) (quoting Jay Rosen).
291
See Martin Brookes, Watching Alone: Social Capital and Public Service
Broadcasting (May 2004) published by The Work Foundation in partnership with
the BBC, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/policies/pdf/watching_alone.pdf. The term
social capital has been picked up and morphed into “civic capital” in the public
journalism movement. Civic capital is created when journalists do their work “in
ways calculated to help public life go well by engaging citizens in it.” David
“Buzz” Merritt, Public Journalism, Independence and Civic Capital … Three Ideas
in Complete Harmony, in MIXED NEWS 180, 182 (Jay Black ed., 1997).
292
Although some non-commercial media entities have engaged in public
journalism, the movement has been concentrated in commercial newspapers.
293
See, e.g., Friedland & Nichols, supra note xx at 12-14 (describing public
journalism’s sponsorship of public deliberative events and the use of “explanatory
framing” to draw readers into an issue in all its complexity by stressing the
relevance and impact on community and personal lives).
294
Scholars have recognized the power of digital tools to foster social integration in
virtual settings or through real time networked communication. See, e.g., SHAPIRO,
supra note xx at 120 (“one of the wondrous qualities of [a digital network] is the
way it allows users to break down boundaries, erase distances, and build
alliances.”). See also id. at 203 (“With its potential for individual empowerment
and unfettered citizen interaction, the Internet has been a harbinger of a society in
which citizens will engage one another in the vital conversations of a democracy.”).
295
See Pesach, supra note xx at 1084-85 (discussing cultural network effects and
distinguishing them from economic network effects on the grounds that more users
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bandwagon effects by alerting viewers to content they might share
with others.296 Public service media might enlist these same
technologies to promote and draw consumers to content that furthered
media policy goals, particularly community-building content. In
doing so, the concept of community need not be limited to the
geographically proximate as it has been in localism policy.297 The use
of interactive tools and distributed digital networks to produce and
disseminate content can produce community in ways that were not
possible in the analog world.
C. Real World Beginnings
Some of these concepts are being implemented in the existing
public television community.298 These approaches take media out of
the box and put it online, in schools, libraries, museums, and the
workplace, leveraging investments in high quality content to achieve
really does increase value for the latter, but only the perception of value for the
former).
296
Personal video recorders typically recommend programming that is similar to
what the consumer routinely views or that media companies have paid to promote,
reinforcing personal preferences and market hierarchies. But the same technology
will also be able to tell viewers what others are watching, perhaps furthering at least
the centripetal impulse. See Peter Grant, Manage TV-Channel Clutter, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 17, 2003, at R6.
297
47 C.F.R. § 73.1120 (2003) (defining the location broadcast licensees are to
serve as “a principal community (city, town or other political subdivision)). Glen
Robinson, among others, has criticized the localism principle for its fidelity to the
physical community as the object to media policy. Glen O. Robinson, The
Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L. J. 899, 942-43
(1998) (“in a world where information can be pulled or pushed from every corner of
the planet, there is something almost quaint about the idea of linking localism and
modern information services.”). See also Yoo, supra note xx at 1668. For support,
but reformulation, of the localism principle, see Andrew Calabrese, Why Localism?
Communication Technology and the Shifting Scales of Political Community, in
COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY 251, 267 (Gregory J. Shepherd et al. ed., 2001)
(calling for a “revised concept of, and renewed commitment to, localism” aimed at
enhancing democratic participation in the “translocal community”).
298
See Richard Somerset-Ward, Public Television in the Digital Age: A Community
Partner, a Digital Perspectives Background Paper in LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN &
NEWTON N. MINOW, A DIGITAL GIFT TO THE NATION: THE 2001 REPORT 239
(2001),
available
at
http://www.digital
promise.org/about/digital_gift/backgroundpapers/17_somerset-ward.pdf (providing
examples of and recommendations for public television community partnerships in
developing and disseminating video content and exploiting digital technologies).
See also DAVID W. KLEEMAN, ONE MISSION, MANY SCREENS: A PBS/MARKLE
FOUNDATION STUDY ON DISTINCTIVE ROLES FOR CHILDREN’S PUBLIC SERVICE
MEDIA IN THE DIGITAL AGE 52-68 (2002) (identifying and proposing successful
community partnerships in the development and dissemination of children’s
programming).
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greater impact and exploiting and enhancing new production and
distribution capabilities.
The examples identified below arise in a traditional public
broadcast context and are limited by the existing constraints of the
Public Broadcasting Act, public television funding, and political
pressures.299 As a result, they address a relatively narrow range of
topics and focus heavily on the broadcast medium. However, they
illustrate ways in which public service media might forge exposure to
media content, in the service of proactive media policy goals, and
develop desired content that would otherwise not be produced, in the
service of reactive goals.
•

•

The production of Bill Moyers’ 2002 documentary on humane dying,
On Our Own Terms, involved $2.5 million and two years of outreach
work to accompany the program. Months before the program aired, 350
hospitals, universities, community organizations and local public
television stations had already enrolled to participate in a 90-minute
training videoconference on the conduct of town meetings, the staffing
of hotlines, and the delivery of professional training.300
Breaking the Cycle, a documentary on the working poor, provides
another example of this multimedia, multi-institutional approach to
video programming. Filming over a two-year period for release in the
fall of 2005, producers are developing a sophisticated outreach program
in connection with the film to target families, workers, and employers,
to offer workplace training, and to provide media resources in family

299

In addition to a severe shortage of funds, one of the chief impediments to more
innovative content development and dissemination within the existing public
service media structure is that the Public Broadcasting Act limits the expenditure of
funds to “public telecommunications services.” 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(1)(C).
300
See Geneva Collins, Outreach Complements Moyers’ On Our Own Terms,
CURRENT (Oct. 30, 2000), at http://www.currrent.org/outreach/out020dying.html.

In Iowa alone, at least 73 towns and cities, with the assistance of Iowa
Public Television, held events related to the series. Id. Similarly ambitious
efforts were undertaken in Philadelphia. The local public television station,
WHYY, formed Caring Community, a volunteer coalition comprised of experts
from more than 75 partners representing non-profit organizations, academic
institutions, government agencies, faith-based organizations and health care systems
in the region. Among Caring Community’s efforts was a 15-part follow on series
called Finding Our Way: Living with Dying in America, which WHYY and its
partners supplemented with related resources. Interview with William J. Marrazzo,
President and CEO, WHYY-TV in Philadelphia, PA (July 2003). See also
WHYY’s Caring Community Coalition, http://www.whyy.org/about/report03/whcaring.html. See generally, PDIA Newsletter: PBS Series On Our Own Terms:
Moyers on Dying Attracts High Ratings and Fosters National Dialogue (Mar. 2001),
at http://www.soros.org/death/newsletter8/onourownterms.html.
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leadership and economic development.301 In addition, national and local
partners, including the Children’s Defense Fund and the Urban Institute,
have lined up to provide resources “to strengthen community and
neighborhood services for low income workers to improve their job
skills.”302
Exploiting connections with schools and online resources, Lost Children
of Rockdale County developed exposure to a 1999 documentary about
an outbreak of syphilis among teenagers in an affluent, suburb of
Atlanta. The Peabody-award winning documentary, reviewed as
“[s]hocking and explicit without sensationalizing,” probed adolescent
disaffection, sexual promiscuity, and substance abuse.303 Because of
outreach efforts, including an online teacher’s guide for introducing the
program to adolescent students,304 and an interactive website with expert
guidance on various teenage problems,305 the program had lasting
impact.
In Kentucky in the spring of 2001, a public broadcasting station
encouraged all readers in the state to consume and discuss the same
book, Kentucky author Barbara Kingsolver’s The Bean Trees. More
than 130 educational institutions, bookstores, schools, businesses, media
outlets, and civic and social service organizations participated.
Materials about the book and promotions were distributed through book
club electronic networks, and the public station devoted a month to the
book, offering a profile of the author, live call-in programs, and an onair panel discussion. Public radio stations simulcast or repeated the
programming. In the end, the book was distributed throughout
classrooms and adult education centers, bookstores and libraries, and
close to 10,000 readers registered to participate in online discussions.306

See
National
Center
for
Outreach,
Outreach
Pipeline,
at
http://www.nationaloutreach.org/PIPELINE/Pipeline.pdf;
see
also
Making
Connections Media Outreach Initiative:
Breaking the Cycle, at
http://www.aecf.org/initiatives/mc/communications/mcmoi/btc_about.htm.
302
See id.
303
See The Lost Children of Rockdale County:
Press Reaction, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/georgia/etc/press.html.
The
reviews also recognized that The Lost Children of Rockdale County is the type of
show that would be unlikely to air on commercial television. See id. (The program
“makes the way NBC uses the phrase ‘must-see TV’ seem a mockery. It is also a
welcome reminder of the special thing that is ‘Frontline.’” (quoting Chicago
Tribune review)).
304
See The Lost Children of Rockland County:
Teacher’s Guide, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/lost/.
305
See The Lost Children of Rockland County:
Interviews, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/georgia/interviews/.
306
See Digital Alliances: Partners in Public Service, Models for Collaboration 12
(Penn
State
University
2002),
at
http://www.benton.org/publibrary/index.html#Television-CommunityMedia.
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In Minnesota, public television’s efforts to leverage its own technology
and resources to partner with local organizations resulted in distinctly
local content and community-oriented public service. A Minneapolis
public station has dedicated a substantial part of its broadcast channel to
an initiative called the Minnesota Channel Partners’ Collaborative,
which produces, promotes, and broadcasts non-profit partners’ most
valuable content.307 The partners help provide the content and pay
production costs, but the station provides production assistance and
quality control, assuring that the product is of high quality.308 The
content is frequently used in community events, performances, and
presentations.
WNYE-TV, a public station owned by the New York City Department
of Education, used just $750,000 to create School Night, a weekly
primetime program engaging more than 3000 public school students in
the production of programming geared to their peers. The station
produced 78 programs, including a quiz show combining academic
knowledge and street smarts.309
It enlisted a prominent local
documentary filmmaker to help more than 150 New York City public
school kids to produce and narrate their own documentaries. Exploiting
other local talent, the station employed more than 3000 students in
creating a talk show, featuring famous graduates from New York City
high schools, including Tim Robbins, Al Sharpton, Harvey Keitel,
astronauts, and physicists.310

These projects are merely prototypes of what might be a far
more robust and extensive public service media. They are bound by
yesterday’s analog technologies and real space encounters, with
limited use of digital technologies beyond the Internet. Moreover,
they are limited by the failure of media policy to set a course for
public service media that would reduce reactive ratings pressures in
favor of explicitly proactive media policies. Nevertheless, from these
307

Through the initiative, the station has worked with the St. Paul Chamber
Orchestra, the Mayo Clinic, the University of Minnesota, and the Minnesota
Department of Agriculture among others. These collaborations have resulted in a
six-hour block of exclusively Minnesota-related programming.
Telephone
interview with James R. Pagliarini, President & CEO Twin Cities Public Television
(July
2,
2003).
See
also
About
MN
Channel,
http://www.tpt.org/mnchannel/about.html.
308
Once production of a program is completed, the station, Twin Cities Public
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examples emerge some basic ingredients for a future public service
media. These include community outreach, widespread talent
development and exploitation, synergistic partnerships with other
non-market actors, the leveraging of content over multiple platforms,
and, perhaps most importantly, a focus on media consumption as well
as production.
V. Conclusion
Digital media demand a new precision in defining policy goals
and new means for achieving them. Theories about the democratic
significance of media that are premised on audience exposure must
contend with an over-exposed and discriminating audience. If we
take seriously the contingent quality of consumer wants – a notion at
the heart of media policy aspirations – then it is important to theorize
more deeply about how media policy might influence the
consumption as well as supply of media content in the public interest.
Subsidies for a robust public service media, as opposed to media
regulations, are the most promising and constitutionally acceptable
way to affect consumption patterns.
The invigoration of public service media as a more powerful
instrument of media policy would implicate a number of existing
communications rules. It would require an expansion of funding to
entities and activities beyond broadcasting. It would require the
reorganization of public broadcast facilities and institutions, shifting
resources from passive distribution of video content to production and
more active models of engagement. Perhaps most significantly, it
would demand a coherent and express statement of purpose for
structuring Congressional appropriations and standards of
accountability for public service media. The purpose would be to
respond to both narrow and broad market failures with content that is
judged not only by the audience it pulls in, but by the audience to
which it is pushed out.

